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ABSTRACT
When the Supreme Court decided District of Columbia v. Heller
and McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court left the U.S. Circuit 
Courts of Appeal to decide the last remaining major Second 
Amendment issue: whether the right to bear arms extends outside of 
the home. Eventually, a circuit split developed over the issue of 
whether the Second Amendment applied outside of the home and 
what types of burdens on that right were permissible. The various 
circuits disagreed on the type of analysis that was required and the 
historical importance of the Second Amendment. Thus, the issue of 
whether the Second Amendment extends outside of the home may be 
ripe for a decision by the Supreme Court. 
If the Supreme Court were to resolve this circuit split, then it 
may remove a contentious issue from the political process resulting 
in social and political backlash that may damage the Court’s 
legitimate role as interpreter of the Constitution. The Court should 
employ Deliberative Democratic theory and Judicial Minimalism to 
ensure that the social and political backlash that followed the 
Court’s Roe v. Wade decision does not reoccur. Using Deliberative 
Democratic theory to resolve the circuit split, the Court would 
consider the interests of both sides and structure the holding to be 
reasonably acceptable to both sides of the issue. Furthermore, by 
using Judicial Minimalism, the Court would be able to limit the 
negative externalities of a broad holding by deciding a narrow issue. 
Last, by applying these theories, the Court will be able to avoid the 
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social and political backlash that may follow a highly contentious 
decision. By avoiding backlash from an overbroad decision, the 
Court would be ensuring that deliberation on the topic of gun rights 
can lead to a more democratic result in the realm of gun rights. 
Thus, the Court would avoid having its holding redefined or 
reinterpreted by future Courts, like the Roe decision was in 1992. 
The Court, in focusing on the theories of Deliberative Democracy 
and Judicial Minimalism in crafting its decision, would ensure that 
the Second Amendment remains a strong fundamental right for years 
to come.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine two counties, one in New York and one in California, 
where the local governments have decided that general self-defense 
is not a sufficient reason for a person to be permitted to carry a 
concealed weapon.1 In this hypothetical, the legislatures have 
required that a person seeking a concealed weapons permit show 
“good cause” to receive a permit.2 Two people, one in New York and 
one in California, are seeking to carry a gun for general self-defense.3
Each person is denied a concealed weapons permit for a lack of 
“good cause” and brings suit in federal district court claiming that 
their Second Amendment right has been infringed.4 On appeal, the 
circuit courts perform radically different analyses and come to 
similar conclusions.5 The Ninth Circuit performs a historical analysis 
of the Second Amendment, does little to address the individual 
plaintiff’s argument supporting the right to bear arms in self-defense 
outside of the home, and holds that there is not and never has been a 
right to bear arms outside of the home.6 The Second Circuit does a 
thorough analysis of the interests of both parties and concludes that 
the regulation was a permissible burden on the Second Amendment.7
Unfortunately, neither circuit has rendered a democratically 
legitimate decision.8
Despite the Second Circuit correctly analyzing the issue by 
considering the legitimate interests of both sides, the court 
incorrectly held that the fundamental right to keep and bear arms for 
1. See Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 927 (9th Cir. 2016); 
Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 2012). 
2. See Peruta, 824 F.3d at 924; Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 83. 
3. See Peruta, 824 F.3d at 924; Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 83. 
4. See Peruta, 824 F.3d at 924; Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 83. 
5. See Peruta, 824 F.3d at 929-39 (using a thorough historical analysis of 
the Second Amendment to determine whether the right to bear arms exists outside of 
the home); Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 88-101 (assuming that the right to bear arms 
exists outside of the home and analyzing the interests of both the government and 
the plaintiff before reaching a conclusion). 
6. See Peruta, 824 F.3d at 929-39. 
7. See Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 88-101. 
8. See infra Part III (discussing the requirements of Deliberative 
Democracy and Judicial Minimalism that can help judges render more democratic 
decisions).
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the purpose of self-defense did not extend outside of the home.9
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit also incorrectly decided the issue, 
incorrectly analyzed the issue, and paid little attention to the 
legitimate interests of the individual plaintiff in carrying a gun for 
self-defense.10 Thus, the Ninth Circuit did little to democratically 
justify its decision by addressing counterarguments, while the 
Second Circuit gave little weight to the historical understanding of 
the Second Amendment.11 The disparities in the analyses and 
holdings of these courts are just two of the problems that have arisen 
out of this circuit split, which includes three other circuits.12
The Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states that 
“[a] well regulated [m]ilitia, being necessary to the security of a free 
State, the right of the people to keep and bear [a]rms, shall not be 
infringed.”13 The Second Amendment has been interpreted to limit 
the federal government’s power in the field of firearm regulation.14
However, a state may restrict a citizen’s Second Amendment right 
under the states’ police power.15 As a result, many states have 
adopted regulations concerning citizens’ ownership of guns.16
Regardless of the regulation of guns, the Supreme Court has 
concluded, through a historical analysis, that gun ownership is an 
individual right that is unrelated to militia service.17
9. See Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 101 (analyzing the interests of both parties 
and holding that “New York’s proper cause requirement is constitutional under the 
Second Amendment as applied to Plaintiffs”).  
10. See Peruta, 824 F.3d at 929-39 (analyzing the history of carrying 
weapons outside of the home and holding that there is no individual right to carry a 
concealed weapon outside of the home). 
11. See id. at 924-42 (failing to acknowledge any existing counter-argument 
and the plaintiff’s arguably valid interest in carrying a concealed weapon); 
Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 88-101.  
12. See infra Part II (discussing the disagreement among the circuits 
concerning whether the right to bear arms in self-defense outside of the home is 
infringed by good cause requirements). 
 13. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 14. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 619-20 (2008) (citing 
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875)). 
15. Id. at 620. 
16. See Peruta, 824 F.3d at 925-27 (summarizing the requirements of 
California’s regulation of firearms, which requires citizens seeking a concealed 
weapons permit to establish “good cause”); Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 
F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2012) (summarizing the “proper cause” requirement of section 
400.00(2)(f) of the New York Penal Law); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 428 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (summarizing the “justifiable need” requirement of section 13:54-
2.4(d)(1) of the New Jersey Administrative Code).  
17. Heller, 554 U.S. at 605. 
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The Supreme Court’s holding on the issue of gun rights in 
District of Columbia v. Heller struck down the District of 
Columbia’s ban on keeping handguns within the home.18 In Heller,
the Court held that an outright ban on handguns for the use of self-
defense within the home was unconstitutional because the ban was 
inconsistent with the individual right to bear arms in self-defense.19
Following Heller, the Court decided McDonald v. City of Chicago in 
which the Court held that the Second Amendment applied to the 
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.20 In McDonald, the Court held that the right to keep and 
bear arms was a fundamental right as evidenced by Second 
Amendment interpretations from the colonial period through the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Heller in 2008.21 Thus, the issues of 
whether the right to bear arms within the home is protected by the 
Second Amendment and whether that right is a fundamental liberty 
has already been decided by the Supreme Court, leaving the issue of 
whether the right to bear arms extends outside of the home to be 
decided by the circuit courts.22
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Peruta v. County of San Diego
widened the circuit split concerning the issue of whether the Second 
Amendment protects a right to bear arms outside of the home.23 The 
18. Id. at 628-29. 
19. Id. at 628. 
20. See McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (“In Heller, we 
held that the Second Amendment protects the right to possess a handgun in the home 
for the purpose of self-defense. Unless considerations of stare decisis counsel 
otherwise, a provision of the Bill of Rights that protects a right that is fundamental 
from an American perspective applies equally to the Federal Government and the 
States. We therefore hold that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller.” (citation omitted)).  
21. Id. at 767-78 (examining “whether the right to keep and bear arms is 
fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty”). For a thorough examination of the 
history of interpretations of the Second Amendment as a fundamental right, see 
Michael Anthony Lawrence, Second Amendment Incorporation Through the 
Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities and Due Process Clauses, 72 MO.
L. REV. 1, 56-71 (2007).
22. See Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (“In sum, we hold that the 
District’s ban on handgun possession in the home violates the Second Amendment, 
as does its prohibition against rendering any lawful firearm in the home operable for 
the purpose of immediate self-defense.”); McDonald, 561 U.S. at 778 (“In sum, it is 
clear that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right 
to keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to our system of 
ordered liberty.”).  
23. See Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 939 (9th Cir. 2016) (“In 
so holding, we join several of our sister circuits that have upheld the authority of 
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Ninth Circuit sided with the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits on 
the issue of concealed carry against the holding of the Seventh 
Circuit.24 The Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits refused to take a 
purely historical approach to interpreting the Second Amendment.25
If the Supreme Court were to decide the issue of whether the right to 
bear arms extends outside of the home, it would be removing another 
contentious issue concerning the Second Amendment from political 
discourse within an eight year timeframe.26 Such a drastic change in a 
short period of time may result in political backlash not seen since 
the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade.27 In order to avoid the political 
backlash of broad decisions that remove controversial issues from 
political discourse, the Court should ensure that its opinion does not 
permanently foreclose political debate on the issue and is as narrow 
as possible to avoid unseen externalities of the opinion.28
Part I discusses the history of the Second Amendment. 
Furthermore, Part I presents Deliberative Democratic theory (also 
known as Deliberative Democracy) and Judicial Minimalism as 
possible solutions to the circuit split. Last, Part I discusses the 
political backlash of Roe v. Wade that the Court should strive to 
avoid when making its next controversial decision in the context of 
the Second Amendment. Part II analyzes the Seventh Circuit
decision on this issue and the circuit split that resulted from holdings 
in the Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits. Finally, Part III 
argues that the Supreme Court should take a prudential position on 
the issue of whether the Second Amendment extends outside of the 
home. By invoking the theories of Deliberative Democracy and 
Judicial Minimalism, the Court may avoid the political backlash that 
may result from political groups becoming further entrenched in their 
views.
states to prohibit entirely or to limit substantially the carrying of concealed or 
concealable firearms.”). 
24. See id.
25. See id. at 939 (summarizing the analytical approaches of the Second, 
Third, and Fourth Circuits on the issue of whether the Second Amendment bestowed 
the right to carry guns outside of the home). 
26. See infra Part III; see also Subsections I.A.4.a-b.  
27. See infra Section I.D. 
28. See infra Part III. 
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I. DEFINING THE SECOND AMENDMENT, DELIBERATIVE 
DEMOCRACY, JUDICIAL MINIMALISM, AND ROE V. WADE BACKLASH
The Supreme Court has utilized the Individual Right theory in 
interpreting the Second Amendment, making the Individual Right 
theory the primary theory for Second Amendment analysis.29
Individual Right theorists have focused exclusively on the history of 
the Amendment and have concluded that the historical purpose of the 
Amendment was to ensure that there was an armed American 
citizenry to fight against any threat to liberty.30 However, the Second 
Amendment does not confer an unlimited right, despite the fact that 
the Supreme Court has deemed the right to keep and bear arms as 
fundamental.31 Furthermore, the current Court is far from a 
unanimous agreement on whether the Second Amendment confers a 
right to individuals or to the states to form a militia.32 The theories of 
Deliberative Democracy and Judicial Minimalism may serve as a 
useful guide for the Court in ensuring that debate on the issue of 
whether the right to bear arms extends outside of the home is not 
prematurely ended.33 Specifically, Deliberative Democracy would 
require the Court to address the interests of both sides, while 
rendering a decision that may be reasonably accepted by all sides.34
Similarly, Judicial Minimalism would require the Court to limit its 
holding to the case in front of it, while limiting the amount of dicta 
that may broaden the opinion beyond the Court’s intended scope.35
Scholars suggest that the Court’s incorporation of Deliberative 
Democratic theory and Judicial Minimalism would help to avoid the 
backlash that may follow when a contentious issue, such as the 
correct interpretation of the Second Amendment or the right to an 
abortion, is removed from political discourse by the Court.36
29. See infra Subsection I.A.1; see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 
U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (concluding that “the Second Amendment conferred an 
individual right to keep and bear arms”); McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 
791 (2010) (concluding that the individual right mentioned in Heller is fundamental 
to individual liberty). 
30. See infra Subsection I.A.2.  
31. See infra Subsections I.A.3-4. 
32. See infra Subsection I.A.4.  
33. See infra Sections I.B-D.  
34. See infra Section I.B. 
35. See infra Section I.C.  
36. See infra Sections I.B-D.  
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A. The Second Amendment 
The majorities in Heller,37 McDonald,38 and Peruta39 each 
undertook a historical analysis to determine whether the Framers 
intended to confer an individual right with the Second Amendment, 
but for different reasons. The majority in Heller used a historical 
approach to determine whether the Second Amendment bestowed an 
individual right to keep and bear arms within an individual’s home.40
Similarly, the McDonald Court analyzed whether the Second 
Amendment right to keep and bear arms was a fundamental right that 
should be applied to the states.41 Finally, the majority in Peruta
mirrored the historical analysis in Heller to determine whether the 
Second Amendment bestowed an individual right to keep and bear 
arms outside of the home.42 In all three cases, the Supreme Court and 
the Ninth Circuit used historical state court decisions, documents, 
and treatises from the founding era to inform their analysis of the 
Second Amendment.43
However, decisions such as Heller, McDonald, and Peruta
were not made in a vacuum and surely took into account the 
competing Second Amendment theories arguing for and against the 
Second Amendment as an individual right.44 Interpreting the Second 
Amendment requires both statutory and historical analysis.45
37. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 605-19 (2008) 
(analyzing the historical understanding of the Second Amendment from ratification 
to the nineteenth century in the context of whether the amendment bestowed an 
individual right).  
38. See McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 768-78 (2010) (analyzing 
the historical understanding of the Second Amendment from the ratification of the 
Second Amendment to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine 
whether the right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right).  
39. See Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 929-39 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(analyzing the historical understanding of the Second Amendment from ratification 
through the nineteenth century to determine whether the right to keep and bear arms 
extends to outside of the home).  
40. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 605-19. 
41. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 768-78. 
42. See Peruta, 824 F.3d at 929-39.  
43. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 605-19; McDonald, 561 U.S. at 768-78; Peruta,
824 F.3d at 929-39. 
44. See Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning 
of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 206 (1983) (describing the rise of 
two opposing interpretations of the Second Amendment). 
45. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 592 (using statutory interpretation to conclude 
that the text of the Amendment guarantees an individual right to keep and bear 
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Proponents of the two competing Second Amendment interpretations 
have undertaken both a historical and statutory analysis and have 
come to differing conclusions.46 Not surprisingly, the issue of 
whether the right to bear arms extends outside of the home resulted 
in similar analyses, but different conclusions.47 This Section will 
present the various cases and types of analyses that constitutional 
scholars and the federal circuit courts have used to analyze the 
Second Amendment, beginning with the dominant Second 
Amendment theory: the Individual Right theory.48
1. The Individual Right Theory 
The Individual Right theory enjoys wide acceptance among the 
general population, nonlegal scholars, and the Supreme Court.49
Opponents of the Individual Right theory often point to the prefatory 
clause of the Amendment as proof that the Amendment was not 
intended to bestow an individual right.50 The Amendment states that 
arms); id. (concluding, through historical analysis, that the Second Amendment is an 
individual right).  
46. See id. at 606-10 (concluding, through historical analysis, that the 
overwhelming majority of commentators agree that individuals were meant to be 
armed under the Second Amendment); id. at 643 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(concluding, through historical analysis, that the Second Amendment bestowed a 
right to the states to form a militia); id. at 592 (majority opinion) (concluding that 
the text of the Amendment guarantees an individual right to keep and bear arms); id.
at 643 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the prefatory clause of the Second 
Amendment guarantees the use of firearms for a military purpose in a militia). 
47. See generally Peruta, 824 F.3d 919; Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 
(7th Cir. 2012); Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012); 
Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 
(4th Cir. 2012). 
48. See infra Subsections I.A.1-4.  
49. See Kates, supra note 44, at 206 (“The individual right view is endorsed 
by only a minority of legal scholars, but accepted by a majority of the general 
populace who, through supporting the idea of controlling guns, increasingly oppose 
their prohibition, believing that law-abiding citizens may properly have them for 
self-defense.”); Heller, 554 U.S. at 592 (concluding that the text of the Second 
Amendment guarantees an individual right to keep and bear arms).  
50. See Kates, supra note 44, at 214 (Individual Rights opponents’ 
“analyses have tended not to come to grips with these obstacles; if they focus on the 
amendment’s wording at all, it is only on the word ‘militia,’ assuming that the 
Framers meant ‘militia’ to refer to ‘a particular military force,’ i.e., the states’ home 
reserve”). 
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a militia is necessary for the security of a free State51 and Individual 
Right opponents have latched onto this prefatory clause as stating the 
clear purpose for the Amendment.52 However, a historical analysis of 
the word “militia” reveals that the Framers of the Constitution made 
an assumption about the population that many would not make 
today.53 The Framers of the Constitution assumed that the citizenry 
would be armed and would, thus, be able to form the militia that the 
Amendment alluded to.54 Therefore, the Individual Right opponents 
are correct when they argue that the Framers’ intent for the Second 
Amendment was to ensure that a militia could be called up at any 
time, but they do not agree with the assumption by Individual Right 
theorists that the Framers also intended to create a right to personal 
gun ownership.55
Furthermore, the Amendment clearly states that “the right of 
the people to keep and bear [a]rms, shall not be infringed.”56 The 
plain language of the Amendment, which confers a right to the 
people, supports the construction that the Second Amendment right 
is one that is enjoyed by individuals, and not by the states as the 
arbiter of the militia.57 Also, the phrase “the people” has been used 
throughout the Bill of Rights and has been interpreted by the 
Supreme Court to confer individual rights to the people.58 Individual 
Right theorists argue that if the Second Amendment confers a state’s 
right, not an individual one,  
 51. U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia being necessary to the 
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be 
infringed.”). 
52. See Kates, supra note 44, at 214. 
53. See id. at 217 (“In short, one purpose of the Founders having been to 
guarantee the arms of the militia, they accomplished that purpose by guaranteeing 
the arms of the individuals who made up the militia. In this respect it would never 
have occurred to the Founders to differentiate between the arms of the two groups in 
the context of the amendment’s language.”).  
54. See id. (“The personally owned arms of the individual were the arms of 
the militia.”).  
55. See id. at 217-18 (“Thus, the amendment’s wording, so opaque to us, 
made perfect sense to the Framers: believing that a militia (composed of the entire 
people possessed of their individually owned arms) was necessary for the protection 
of a free state, they guaranteed the people’s right to possess those arms.”).  
 56. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
57. See Kates, supra note 44, at 218 (arguing that it would be illogical to 
think “that the Framers ill-advisedly used the phrase ‘right of the people’ to describe 
what was being guaranteed when what they actually meant was ‘right of the 
states’”).  
58. See id. at 218 (“The phrase ‘the people’ appears in four other provisions 
of the Bill of Rights, always denoting rights pertaining to individuals.”).  
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[T]he following set of propositions must be accepted: (1) when the first 
Congress drafted the Bill of Rights it used “right of the people” in the first 
amendment to denote a right of individuals (assembly); (2) then, some 
sixteen words later, it used the same phrase in the second amendment to 
denote a right belonging exclusively to states; (3) but then, forty-six words 
later, the fourth amendment’s “right of the people” had reverted to its 
normal individual right meaning; (4) “right of the people” was again used 
in the natural sense in the ninth amendment; and (5) finally, in the tenth 
amendment the first Congress specifically distinguished “the states” from 
“the people,” although it had failed to do so in the second amendment.59
The Individual Right theorists believe that their structural 
argument concerning the use of “right of the people” is a convincing 
one, especially in light of the first Congress’s clear intention to 
distinguish “the people” from “the states” in the text of the Tenth 
Amendment.60 Thus, Individual Right theorists have a convincing 
structural statutory interpretation argument that relies on the notion 
that the Framers’ use of “right of the people” was meant to actually 
confer a right to individual people, not to the militias in the states.61
Individual Right theorists suggest it would be unreasonable to 
assume that the Framers meant to confer a right to the states by using 
the wording “right of the people,” when the Tenth Amendment 
actually confers rights to the states by specifically addressing the 
states in the text.62
2. The Historical Purposes of the Second Amendment 
The two purposes of the Second Amendment, according to 
Individual Right theorists, are: (1) to provide citizens with a means 
of self-defense; and (2) to serve as a check on tyranny.63 The overall 
purpose, which would encompass these two specific purposes, was to 
give citizens the right to protect themselves from anyone seeking to 
infringe their individual liberty.64 The right to self-defense against the 
59. Id.  
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second 
Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461, 467 (1995) (recognizing that Individual Right 
theorists believe that the Second Amendment serves the purposes of providing 
citizens the ability to use self-defense and as a check on government tyranny).  
64. See id. (arguing that the Second Amendment “allowed individuals to 
defend themselves from outlaws of all kinds—not only ordinary criminals, but also 
soldiers and government officials who exceeded their authority, for in the legal and 
philosophical framework of the time no distinction was made between the two”). 
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tyranny of the government was considered synonymous with the 
right to self-defense against common criminals.65 While the 
commentators of the nineteenth century identified the two purposes 
as distinct purposes, many of them agreed that the Individual Right 
theory was supported by the Second Amendment.66
The purposes of the Second Amendment, as well as the 
Individual Right theory, can be traced back to the English Bill of 
Rights and American colonial practice.67 The American right to bear 
arms, codified in the Second Amendment, was an expansion of the 
English Bill of Rights and was in agreement with the colonial 
precedent of keeping and bearing arms for individual protection.68
Thus, the self-defense justification of the right to bear arms is 
inextricably tied to the English Bill of Rights and colonial practice, 
which provided the foundation for the Second Amendment.69
Furthermore, the Framers of the Constitution explicitly rejected 
language that would link the right to bear arms solely to the common 
defense of the nation.70 Second Amendment scholars argue that the 
Framers intended to provide society with arms under the assumption 
that private arms in the hands of citizens would help defend their 
liberties against any infringers.71 Therefore, the reasons the Framers 
adopted the Second Amendment, to protect against tyranny and for 
general self-defense, may still be useful to Americans today. 
65. See id.
66. See id. at 470 (quoting 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1890, at 746 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., Da 
Capo Press 1970) (1891); Thomas M. Cooley, The Abnegation of Self-Government,
PRINCETON REV. 209, 213-14 (1883)).
67. See JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 162 (1994) (“Such
an individual right was a legacy of the English Bill of Rights. This is also plain from 
American colonial practice, the debates over the Constitution, and state proposals 
for what was to become the Second Amendment.”).  
68. See id. (“In keeping with colonial precedent, the American article 
broadened the English protections. English restrictions had limited the right to have 
arms to Protestants and made the type and quantity of such weapons dependent upon 
what was deemed ‘suitable’ to a person’s ‘condition.’”).  
69. See id.
70. See id. (“These privately owned arms were meant to serve a larger 
purpose as well, albeit the American framers of the Second Amendment, like their 
English predecessors, rejected language linking their right to ‘the common defence.’ 
When, as Blackstone phrased it, ‘the sanctions of society and laws are found 
insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression,’ these private weapons would 
afford the people the means to vindicate their liberties.” (citation omitted)).  
71. See id.
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3. Widely Accepted Limits on the Second Amendment 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the right is subject 
to government regulation, especially by the states.72 In Heller and 
McDonald, the Supreme Court made it clear that an outright ban on 
weapons inside the home destroyed the Second Amendment right to 
keep and bear arms.73 However, in both decisions, the Court noted 
that the Second Amendment may be regulated and that common-
sense regulations would not infringe the Second Amendment.74 The 
Court recognized that, like most rights in the Bill of Rights, the 
rights conferred by the Second Amendment are not unlimited.75
Furthermore, the Second Amendment right has long been considered 
an area of the Constitution that is subject to heavy regulation by the 
states.76 As a result, courts have held that restrictions like licensing 
laws, background checks, and waiting periods are not inconsistent 
with the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.77
This rise in the regulation of guns by the states was a direct 
result of the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
Cruikshank,78 in which the Court left the issue of gun regulation 
72. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27 (2008). 
73. See id. at 628-29 (holding that an outright ban on handguns “under any 
. . . standard[] of scrutiny . . . would fail constitutional muster”); McDonald v. City 
of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (holding that the Second Amendment is a 
fundamental right that applies to the states and that an outright ban of handguns by 
the state is unconstitutional).  
74. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27 (“Although we do not undertake an 
exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, 
nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on 
the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the 
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or 
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”); 
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 786 (recognizing the longstanding prohibitions of firearms 
listed in Heller and stating that those longstanding prohibitions are not hindered by 
the Court’s holding).  
75. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (“Like most rights, the right secured by the 
Second Amendment is not unlimited.”).  
76. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875) (holding that 
the Second Amendment only limits the federal government’s power in relation to 
gun rights).  
77. See Reynolds, supra note 63, at 481 (“Furthermore, licensing laws, 
background checks, and waiting periods—so long as all are reasonable and not 
simply covert efforts at restricting the availability of guns to those who qualify—do 
not violate the right, arguments of overzealous gun enthusiasts to the contrary 
notwithstanding.”).  
 78. 92 U.S. 542 (1875). 
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exclusively to the states.79 As a result, states have devised creative 
ways to regulate guns, such as the “good cause” statutes that states 
like New York, New Jersey, and Maryland have adopted, which limit 
the ability of a person to carry a concealed weapon for the sole 
purpose of self-defense.80 However, these statutes were met with 
opposition by citizens arguing that the statutes effectively destroyed 
what they believed was their right to carry a weapon outside of the 
home for the purpose of self-defense.81 The existing circuit split 
heavily favors “good cause” statutes as being permissible under 
Heller and McDonald.82 Thus, reasonable regulations of guns by the 
states are legal, but states may never impose an outright ban, or what 
may amount to an outright ban, on guns under Heller.83
4. Defining the Second Amendment in the Wake of Heller and 
McDonald
Second Amendment jurisprudence was changed drastically as a 
result of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Heller84 and McDonald.85
As a result of these “maximalist” decisions, the Supreme Court 
solidified the individual right to keep and bear arms while 
incorporating the Amendment to apply to state governments as 
79. See id. at 553.  
80. See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 431-32 (3d Cir. 2013) (upholding 
New Jersey’s law requiring an applicant to show a “justifiable need” to receive a 
concealed weapons permit); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 868 (4th Cir. 
2013) (upholding Maryland’s “good-and-substantial-reason” requirement to receive 
a concealed weapons permit); Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 101 
(2d Cir. 2012) (upholding a New York law requiring an applicant to show “proper 
cause”). 
81. See Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(describing the appellants’ argument “that their counties’ definitions of good cause 
violate their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms” by requiring that they 
demonstrate “‘good cause’ to carry a concealed firearm”); Moore v. Madigan, 702 
F.3d 933, 934 (7th Cir. 2012) (describing the challenge to the Illinois law that 
resulted in an outright ban on carrying guns in public).  
82. See Drake, 724 F.3d at 431-32 (upholding New Jersey’s law requiring 
an applicant to show a “justifiable need” to receive a concealed weapons permit); 
Woollard, 712 F.3d at 868 (upholding Maryland’s “good-and-substantial-reason” 
requirement to receive a concealed weapons permit); Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 101 
(upholding the “proper cause” statute under intermediate scrutiny and giving 
deference to the legislature to make policy decisions concerning guns). 
83. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-28 (2008). 
 84. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).  
 85. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).  
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well.86 Thus, when the Court decided two issues concerning the right 
to keep and bear arms, it effectively removed them from public 
discourse.87 The Court, in Heller, held that the right to keep and bear 
arms within one’s home is an individual right.88 In McDonald, the 
Court held that the Second Amendment conferred a fundamental 
right and that the Due Process Clause incorporates the Second 
Amendment right.89 Thus, two issues were removed from public 
discourse in a dramatically short time span and, as a result, Second 
Amendment jurisprudence changed drastically.90
a. District of Columbia v. Heller 
In Heller, the Court addressed the issue of whether the District 
of Columbia’s outright ban on handguns was prohibited by the 
Second Amendment.91 The District’s laws, which made it a crime to 
carry an unregistered handgun and prohibited the registration of 
handguns, effectively resulted in a ban on keeping any handguns 
inside the District of Columbia.92 The Court held that the Second 
Amendment conferred the right to keep and bear arms to 
86. See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 27 (1996) (“A court that is determined to be maximalist may fill its 
opinion with broad pronouncements . . . .”).  
87. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628-29 (holding that an outright ban on 
handguns would fail constitutional muster under any standard of scrutiny); 
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 791 (holding that the Second Amendment is a fundamental 
right that applies to the states and that an outright ban of handguns by the state is 
unconstitutional). 
88. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 595. 
89. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 791 (holding that the Second Amendment is 
a fundamental right that applies to the states and that an outright ban of handguns by 
the state is unconstitutional).  
 90. The third issue concerning the Second Amendment is this issue 
presented by the circuit split discussed in this note of whether the Second 
Amendment right extends to carrying weapons outside of the home. If the Supreme 
Court were to decide whether the right extends to outside of the home this year, the 
Supreme Court would likely have concluded all major Second Amendment 
Jurisprudence within a seven-year span. See infra Part II. 
91. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 573.
92. See id. at 574-75. 
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individuals.93 However, the Court limited its interpretation of the 
Second Amendment to keeping and bearing arms within the home.94
To begin the analysis, the Court interpreted both the 
“operative” clause and the “prefatory” clause separately to determine 
their individual meanings.95 The Court, in interpreting the operative 
clause, concluded that the phrase “right of the people” suggests that 
the right is one conferred upon individuals.96 The Court agreed with 
the Individual Right approach that individual rights conferred by the 
Constitution have the following two structural ingredients: a “right” 
that is attributed to “the people.”97 Next, the Court concluded that the 
word “arms” has the same meaning today as it did in the eighteenth 
century.98 According to the Court, the word “arms” referred “to 
weapons that were not specifically designed for military use and 
were not employed in a military capacity.”99 Next, the Court relied 
on Muscarello v. United States,100 in which the Court defined the 
meaning of “bear arms” as to “wear, bear, or carry . . . upon the 
person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose . . . of being 
armed and ready for offensive or defensive action.”101 These two 
interpretations of the separate elements of the operative clause 
supported the Court’s later conclusion that the operative clause 
guarantees an individual the right to bear arms in case of 
confrontation.102
93. See id. at 595 (“There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text 
and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and 
bear arms.”).  
94. See id. at 635 (“In sum, we hold that the District’s ban on handgun 
possession in the home violates the Second Amendment, as does its prohibition 
against rendering any lawful firearm in the home operable for the purpose of 
immediate self-defense.”). 
95. See id. at 579-600 (discussing the meaning of the operative clause and 
the prefatory clause of the Second Amendment separately).  
96. See id. at 579-80.
97. Compare id. at 580, with Kates, supra note 44, at 218. 
98. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 581 (“Before addressing the verbs ‘keep’ and 
‘bear,’ we interpret their object: ‘Arms.’ The 18th-century meaning is no different 
from the meaning today. The 1773 edition of Samuel Johnson’s dictionary defined 
‘arms’ as ‘[w]eapons of offence, or armour of defence.’”).  
99. Id.
 100. 524 U.S. 125 (1998). 
101. Heller, 554 U.S. at 584 (quoting Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 143).  
102. See id. at 592 (“Putting all of these textual elements together, we find 
that they guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of 
confrontation.”).
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Next, the Court turned to its analysis of the prefatory clause to 
determine if it also supported an Individual Right interpretation.103
The Court identified the prefatory clause as “[a] well regulated 
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State.”104 The Court 
relied on the definition of the word “militia” from United States v. 
Miller,105 in which the Court held that “the Militia comprised all 
males physically capable of acting in concert for the common 
defense.”106 However, the Miller Court rejected the construction that 
the word “militia” referred exclusively to those able-bodied men 
convened by the states or by Congress.107 The Court held that the 
Constitution assumes that the militia already exists—Congress 
merely has the power to call for the militia.108 Finally, the Court 
concluded that the meaning of the wording “Security of a Free State” 
means the security of a free country, not each individual state.109
Therefore, the Court concluded that the prefatory clause served the 
distinct purpose of identifying the militia, comprised of individually 
armed and able-bodied men, as being necessary to ensure that the 
country remain free.110
Next, the Court turned to historical legal scholars to determine 
whether they understood the Second Amendment to confer such an 
individual right.111 St. George Tucker referred to the Second 
Amendment “as the true palladium of liberty” and said that the “[t]he 
right to self defence is the first law of nature.”112 In 1825, William 
Rawle concluded that the plain language of the Amendment placed a 
general prohibition on any attempt of government to disarm the 
103. See id. at 595 (“Before turning to limitations upon the individual right, 
however, we must determine whether the prefatory clause of the Second 
Amendment comports with our interpretation of the operative clause.”).  
104. Id. (“The prefatory clause reads: ‘A well regulated Militia, being 
necessary to the security of a free State . . . .’”).  
 105. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).  
106. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 
174, 179 (1939)).  
107. See id. at 596. 
108. See id. (“Unlike armies and navies, which Congress is given the power 
to create . . . the militia is assumed by Article I already to be in existence.”).  
109. See id. at 597 (“It is true that the term ‘State’ elsewhere in the 
Constitution refers to individual States, but the phrase ‘security of a free State’ and 
close variations seem to have been terms of art in 18th-century political discourse, 
meaning a ‘free country’ or free polity.”).  
110. See id. at 595-98. 
111. See id. at 605-19 (discussing the post-ratification, pre-civil war, and 
post-civil war Second Amendment commentators).  
112. See id. at 606.  
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people.113 Furthermore, Joseph Story compared the individual right to 
bear arms bestowed upon Englishmen in the English Bill of Rights to 
the Second Amendment right conferred by the Constitution.114 The 
Court concluded that most post-ratification commentators supported 
the theory that the Second Amendment was a preexisting right of the 
individual.115
Next, the Court turned to Pre-Civil War case law to determine 
whether the interpretation of the Second Amendment changed from 
the post-ratification commentators to the Pre-Civil War courts.116
Many of the Pre-Civil War courts agreed that the right to bear arms 
was conferred upon individuals, but that right was subject to 
restrictions by the states.117 The Court analyzed three cases from 
Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Louisiana, all of which agreed that the 
right to bear arms was an individual right.118 However, the Court 
recognized that there were restrictions on the Second Amendment 
right.119 For example, in Cruikshank, the Supreme Court held that the 
States were free to regulate guns under their police power.120
113. See id. at 607 (“The first [principle] is a declaration that a well regulated 
militia is necessary to the security of a free state; a proposition from which few will 
dissent. . . . The corollary from the first position is, that the right of the people to 
keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. . . . The prohibition is general. No clause 
in the constitution could by any rule of construction be conceived to give to congress 
a power to disarm the people.” (quoting WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 121-22 (1825))).
114. See id. at 608 (quoting 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1891, at 747 (1833)).
115. See id. at 605. 
116. See id. at 610-14. 
117. Id. at 611 (“Many early-19th century state cases indicated that the 
Second Amendment right to bear arms was an individual right unconnected to 
militia service, though subject to certain restrictions.”).  
118. See id. at 610-13; Johnson v. Tompkins, 13 F. Cas. 840, 852 (C.C.E.D. 
Pa. 1833) (No. 7,416) (holding that “[a citizen] had a right to carry arms in defence 
of his property or person, and to use them, if either were assailed with such force, 
numbers or violence as made it necessary for the protection or safety of either”); 
Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846) (holding that the Second Amendment protects 
a “natural right of self-defence”); State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 490 (1850) 
(holding that the Constitution guarantees citizens the right to carry weapons).  
119. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 620-28 (discussing prior Supreme Court 
precedent interpreting the Second Amendment and the historical limitations on the 
right to keep and bear arms).  
120. See id. at 620 (“States, we said, were free to restrict or protect the right 
under their police powers.”); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875) 
(implying that regulation of the Second Amendment by the States is permissible 
because “[t]he second amendment . . . means no more than that it shall not be 
infringed by Congress”). The holding in Cruikshank would later be narrowed as the 
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Similarly, in Miller,121 the Court held that a short barrel shotgun was 
not military equipment considered to be useful in the common 
defense.122 While the Court summarized the holding of Miller as 
merely demonstrating that the Second Amendment only applies to 
certain types of weapons,123 the Court ultimately concluded that like 
other rights conferred by the Bill of Rights, the Second Amendment 
is not unlimited.124
Following its textual and historical analysis, the Court 
concluded that the Second Amendment guaranteed the individual the 
“right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”125
However, the Court, constrained by the facts of this particular case, 
limited their holding to the right to possess handguns within the 
home.126 The issue of whether the right defined in Heller extended 
outside of the home was addressed and confirmed in dicta, but was 
not part of the holding due to the specific facts of the case.127
b. McDonald v. City of Chicago
In McDonald v. City of Chicago,128 the Court considered 
whether the Second Amendment right defined in Heller applied to 
the states.129 The plaintiffs in McDonald challenged Chicago’s 
handgun ban, which was implemented to reduce gun violence within 
the city.130 Plaintiffs lived in high-crime neighborhoods and, as a 
Second Amendment was applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
 121. 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
122. Id. at 178 (“In the absence of any evidence trending to show that 
possession or use of a ‘shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in 
length’ at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency 
of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees 
the right to keep and bear such an instrument.”).  
123. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 623 (“Miller stands only for the proposition that 
the Second Amendment right, whatever its nature, extends only to certain types of 
weapons.”).  
124. See id. at 595 (“[W]e do not read the Second Amendment to protect the 
right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do not read 
the First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose.”).  
125. Id. at 592. 
126. See id. at 628. 
127. See id. at 628, 635. 
 128. 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
129. See id. at 750. 
130. See id. at 750-51 (“Chicago enacted its handgun ban to protect its 
residents ‘from the loss of property and injury or death from firearms.’”).  
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result, were targeted and threatened by criminals.131 The plaintiffs 
argued that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibited the states from infringing the Second Amendment right 
recognized by the Court in Heller.132 As a result, the Court addressed 
the question of whether the Second Amendment is “fundamental to 
our scheme of ordered liberty” or, in other words, “whether this right 
is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’”133
The Court’s initial analysis relied heavily on Heller, which 
recognized that the right of an individual to bear arms in self-defense 
is protected by the Second Amendment.134 Furthermore, the historical 
analysis in Heller led the majority in McDonald to conclude that the 
Second Amendment is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition.”135 However, the McDonald majority continued its analysis 
by examining interpretations of the Second Amendment following 
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.136 Following the end 
of the Civil War, the Union Army and the Thirty-Ninth Congress 
attempted to protect the right of freed slaves to keep and bear arms in 
self-defense.137 Specifically, the Thirty-Ninth Congress passed the 
Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1866 and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
precursors to the Fourteenth Amendment, which aimed to provide 
equal protection of the law, including the right to bear arms 
conferred by the Second Amendment.138 However, the failure of 
131. See id. at 751 (summarizing the factual situation faced by Otis 
McDonald and Colleen Lawson in which both plaintiffs have been threatened by 
criminals in their neighborhoods).  
132. See id. at 753. 
133. See id. at 767 (“In answering that question . . . we must decide whether 
the right to keep and bear arms is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty, or 
as we have said in a related context, whether this right is ‘deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history and tradition.’” (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 
721 (1997))).  
134. See id. (“Self-defense is a basic right, recognized by many legal systems 
from ancient times to the present day, and in Heller, we held that individual self-
defense is ‘the central component’ of the Second Amendment right.” (quoting 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008))).  
135. See id. at 768 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721).  
136. See id. at 770-78.  
137. See id. at 773 (“Union Army commanders took steps to secure the right 
of all citizens to keep and bear arms, but the 39th Congress concluded that 
legislative action was necessary. Its efforts to safeguard the right to keep and bear 
arms demonstrate that the right was still recognized to be fundamental.”). 
138. See id. at 773-75 (summarizing the Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1866 and 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as attempts to provide equal protection of the law, 
including the right to bear arms, prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment).
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Congress’s legislation led to the proposal and ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which the Court in McDonald concluded 
was evidence that the right to keep and bear arms was fundamental 
to the liberty of the country.139
McDonald reaffirmed the longstanding, constitutional 
limitations on the Second Amendment that the Court confirmed in 
Heller.140 The Court held that the Second Amendment right defined 
in Heller was fundamental to American liberty and, therefore, the 
Due Process Clause incorporates the right conferred by the Second 
Amendment.141 Therefore, Chicago’s outright ban on handguns was 
no longer clearly constitutional and was subject to the limitations of 
the Second Amendment.142 McDonald limited the ability of state 
legislatures to regulate the Second Amendment right to bear arms, 
which gave rise to the circuit split examined in this Note.143
B. Deliberative Democracy 
Like in Heller and McDonald, the Supreme Court often decides 
constitutional issues that remain permanently engrained as law.144 In 
a democracy, the permanent decisions made by unelected judges 
should be analyzed from the viewpoints of democratic theory in 
order to determine whether judges have overstepped their democratic 
boundaries. Deliberative Democratic theory, in the context of 
judicial action, focuses on whether the action taken by the court can 
139. See id. at 776 (“Evidence from the period immediately following the 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment only confirms that the right to keep and 
bear arms was considered fundamental.”). Congress deemed their legislation a 
failure at ensuring newly freed slaves were able to bear arms in self-defense due to 
many freed slaves being disarmed by Confederate sympathizers after the Civil War. 
Id. at 772. 
140. See id. at 786. 
141. See id. at 791 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“In Heller, we held that the 
Second Amendment protects the right to possess a handgun in the home for the 
purpose of self-defense. Unless considerations of stare decisis counsel otherwise, a 
provision of the Bill of Rights that protects a right that is fundamental from an 
American perspective applies equally to the Federal Government and the States. We 
therefore hold that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller.”).  
142. See id. at 752, 791 (holding that the judgment of the Court of Appeals, 
which held that an outright ban on handguns was permissible, was reversed). 
143. See infra Part II. 
144. See supra Subsection I.A.4. 
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be supported by the ideals of democracy.145 The theory focuses on 
two main goals: (1) to encourage people to deliberate and justify 
their positions; and (2) to produce policy that is the best possible 
outcome for the most people.146 The theory recognizes that in a 
heterogeneous democracy, such as the United States, diversity of 
opinion can cause instability.147 Furthermore, contentious issues 
decided by the Court, such as abortion or gun rights, have the 
potential to permanently entrench groups in their political 
viewpoints, thus resulting in political and cultural backlash.148
To avoid societal backlash and raising the stakes of politics, 
Deliberative Democratic theorists argue that the Court should ensure 
that its decisions address opposing arguments in a respectful manner 
and justify its position to all interested parties.149 Since Deliberative 
Democratic theory requires that the governed have power in the 
decision making process, the Court must be careful not to usurp the 
will of the people.150 Instead, the Court should take on the role of the 
educator and guide the values of Americans in a way that “shows us 
where our own convictions lead.”151 To accomplish this purpose, the 
Court, as an institution, must do more than agree with the status quo 
on the issue.152 The Court’s decision on a contentious issue should 
“reflect the people in all their diversity, so that all the people may 
feel that their particular interests and even prejudices . . . were 
145. See generally Maya Sen, Courting Deliberation: An Essay on 
Deliberative Democracy in the American Judicial System, 27 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 303 (2013).
146. See id. at 305 (“At the heart of deliberative democracy is the idea that 
when free and equal people come together and discuss important decisions jointly—
justifying their reasons publicly on the basis of generally understood principles—
then the resulting policy will be both better for society and better for the participants 
themselves.”).  
147. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can 
Support Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1294 
(2005).
148. See id. at 1313. 
149. See Sen, supra note 145, at 306. 
150. See id. (noting that one requirement of Deliberative Democracy is that 
the governed have a say in how they are governed); Anthony Townsend Kronman, 
Alexander Bickel’s Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567, 1574 (1985)
(recognizing that when the Supreme Court holds an act passed by the people’s 
legislature unconstitutional, “it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual 
people of the here and now” (quoting ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH 17 (1962))).
151. See Kronman, supra note 150, at 1575, 1581. 
152. See id. at 1592. 
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brought to bear on the decision-making process.”153 Furthermore, the 
Court’s decision on a contentious issue would be democratically 
acceptable as long as the side in disagreement with the decision can 
understand the essential content of the decision.154 The ideals of 
Deliberative Democratic theory incorporate “an ideal of reciprocity, 
in which citizens are aware of and responsive to one another’s 
interests and claims.”155 Therefore, a Court seeking to adhere to 
Deliberative Democratic theory would justify its decision in terms 
that could be reasonably accepted by both sides of the issue.156
However, Deliberative Democratic theory may not be the best 
theory to apply in this particular circuit split. For example, opponents 
of Deliberative Democracy, so-called Majoritarian Democrats, 
believe that consideration of the minority view, while admirable, is 
not necessary because in a democracy a majority rules.157
Majoritarian Democrats view democracy as follows: “All qualified 
members of the political community have an equal voice in political 
decisions made by the community, such that political decisions 
generating the support of a majority of the community’s members for 
that reason carry the day.”158 In essence, a majority rules no matter 
what the minority has to say about the particular issue.159 While 
opponents of Deliberative Democracy may feel that Majoritarian 
Democracy is a more viable goal to achieve in a democracy, they fail 
to consider the disastrous effects of a democracy that shuns 
deliberation and substitutes the majoritarian will.160
“Enclave deliberation” is “deliberation within small groups of 
like-minded people”161 and is the unintended result of groups being 
locked out of reasoned deliberation on the issues they care about.162
153. See id.
154. See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY? 4 (2004). 
155. See Sunstein, supra note 86, at 37.  
156. Id.
157. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries 
and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 702 (1995).  
158. Id. at 703 (defining the Majoritarian Principle of Democracy).  
159. See id.
160. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS 
DO 15 (2001) (discussing “enclave deliberation” as a hindrance to deliberation in a 
democracy, generally).  
161. See id.
162. See Eskridge, supra note 147, at 1294 (discussing democracy as 
“dynamic and fragile” because of the possibility that groups may exit the democratic 
process and forego deliberation on issues).  
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When a political group feels that its views are not considered in 
making important decisions, such as in a Majoritarian Democracy, 
the group may exit the deliberative process and voice their opinions 
in enclave deliberation, rather than with other political groups.163
Thus, once a political group has foregone deliberation, the group will 
likely grow more extreme164 and likely oppose the decisions made by 
the majority without their consent.165 Therefore, the principles of 
Majoritarian Democracy may not be as helpful as compared to the 
principles of Deliberative Democracy, especially when the issue 
being decided is a contentious one. 
C. Judicial Minimalism 
If Deliberative Democracy is the lens through which judges 
should view their prospective decisions, then Judicial Minimalism is 
the tool judges should use to make their decisions. The theory of 
Judicial Minimalism advocates for the Court to only decide the 
issues that must be decided and not to include overzealous reasoning 
that may lead to unwanted effects.166 Judicial opinions should be 
narrow in their holdings, rather than wide, so that courts only decide 
the case that is in front of them.167 Furthermore, judicial opinions 
should be shallow in their reasoning, rather than deep, so that the 
Court produces “concrete judgments backed by unambitious 
reasoning.”168 By limiting the reasoning to only the amount that is 
necessary to reach the correct conclusion and to guide lower courts, 
the Court will ensure that the opinion is one “on which people can 
converge from diverse foundations.”169 Furthermore, a minimalistic 
163. Id. (“Pluralist democracy is dynamic and fragile. It is dynamic because 
the nature, composition, and balance of politically relevant groups shift over time. It 
is fragile because it depends on the commitment of all politically relevant groups to 
its processes. Political losers may exit the system unless they think their interests 
will be accommodated or their losses from exiting will exceed their gains.”).  
164. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 160, at 22-23 (“The result is that groups often 
make more extreme decisions than would the typical or average individual in the 
group (where ‘extreme’ is defined solely internally, by reference to the group’s 
initial dispositions).”).  
165. See infra Section I.D (discussing the backlash of the evangelical right 
following the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade).  
166. See Sunstein, supra note 86, at 15, 20. 
167. Id. at 15. 
168. See id. at 20. 
169. See id.
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judicial strategy may further the democratic process on a contentious 
issue.170
Judicial Minimalism may further the democratic process by 
leaving the bulk of a contentious issue to the states or political 
branches of government.171 Also, Judicial Minimalism acknowledges 
that judges may decide an issue incorrectly or may stray from the 
focus of a particular issue through unneeded dicta.172 Therefore, 
when an issue concerning the constitutionality of a statute is before 
the Court, the combination of a narrow and shallow holding, with the 
Court’s reliance on precedent, will provide “desirable incentives for 
participants in the democratic process.”173 The predictability of how 
the Court will analyze a statute will give Congress a guideline of 
how to frame and justify a statute to withstand constitutional 
scrutiny, thus, forcing democratic deliberation.174
D. The Backlash to Roe v. Wade 
Roe v. Wade,175 one of the most prominent and controversial 
Supreme Court decisions, illustrates the effects that a decision may 
have when the Court fails to utilize the ideals of Deliberative 
Democracy and Judicial Minimalism.176 In Roe v. Wade the Supreme 
Court held that the right to privacy included a woman’s decision to 
have an abortion.177 The Court reasoned that either the concept of 
liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment or the reservation of rights to 
the people present in the Ninth Amendment were broad enough to 
encompass and protect a woman’s decision to have an abortion.178
However, the Court did not specifically identify which Amendment 
170. See id.
171. See id. (“In sum, minimalism can promote democracy because it allows 
democratic processes room to maneuver.”).  
172. See id. (“Judges should allow such room because their judgments might 
be wrong and, even if right, their judgments may be counterproductive.”).  
173. See id. at 27.  
174. See id. (“If courts do not alter their interpretation of statutes, even when 
their interpretation is wrong, Congress will have an especially clear background 
against which to work, knowing that Congress itself must correct any mistake.”).  
 175. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
176. See supra Sections I.B-C. 
177. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 (“We, therefore, conclude that the right of 
personal privacy includes the abortion decision . . . .”). 
178. See id. at 153. 
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the liberty stemmed from.179 Furthermore, the Court concluded that 
the right to privacy and, by extension, the right to have privacy 
during a decision to abort a fetus, were fundamental rights.180 The 
Court further reasoned that because the right to privacy was a 
fundamental right, a state’s regulation of abortion must be “justified 
only by a ‘compelling state interest’” and the regulation “must be 
narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at 
stake.”181 Thus, the Court decided that the right to choose to have an 
abortion is fundamental, so a state would have to satisfy strict 
scrutiny with any legislation that regulated the right.182
Some legal scholars have suggested that Roe was decided in a 
manner that was too broad and drastic.183 Professor Robert Post 
argues that the Roe decision galvanized conservative opposition not 
only to the liberalization of abortion, but to the entire liberal 
agenda.184 Professor Post summarized the backlash as a social 
movement much larger than Roe since the backlash against abortion 
began before the decision and did not gain prominence until years 
after.185 This backlash resulted from the Court’s willingness to 
recognize what it deemed to be national values by adjudicating using 
the open-ended wording of various constitutional amendments, 
rather than the explicit language of the Constitution.186 Furthermore, 
Professor Post recognizes that misunderstandings of the Constitution 
by the public can cause strong backlash when the Court decides the 
most contentious issues.187 In recent years, mass shootings have 
become more prominent and the public has become more and more 
entrenched on the issue of guns in American society.188 As a result, 
179. See id. (declaring that the right to privacy for a woman’s abortion 
decision is covered by the Fourteenth or Ninth Amendment, but does not say which 
Amendment is the true source of the right).  
180. See id. at 155.  
181. See id.
182. See id. at 154-55. 
183. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic 
Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. CIV. RTS.–CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 373,
374 (2007); Eskridge, supra note 147, at 1285-87, 1312-13; Sunstein, supra note 86, 
at 49-50. 
184. See Post & Siegel, supra note 183, at 407-08. 
185. See id. at 423. 
186. See id. at 378. 
187. See id. at 379. 
188. See Jordan Fabian, Obama, Dems All in on Gun Control in 2016, HILL
(Jan. 5, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/264745-
obama-dems-all-in-on-gun-control-in-2016 [https://perma.cc/892E-QU6V]; see also
Alexandra Samuels, University of Texas Protestors to Fight Guns with Sex Toys,
 Passive Virtues and the Second Amendment 1383 
contentious issues, such as the debate over guns in society, if decided 
too quickly or broadly, may result in irreversible backlash.189 That 
backlash is further evidenced by the Court’s subsequent 
recharacterization of Roe v. Wade’s holding in Planned Parenthood 
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.190
In Casey, the Court recharacterized its holding in Roe by 
disposing of the rigid trimester framework of when an abortion could 
be performed, changing the analysis from strict scrutiny to undue 
burden, and allowing the state to pursue its interest in potential life.191
In its opening paragraph, the Court noted that “[l]iberty finds no 
refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”192 This opening line may be a 
reference to the intense backlash and scrutiny that the Court endured 
in the years following the decision of Roe v. Wade, in which many 
commentators and abortion opponents called the decision into 
question.193 Thus, backlash may have influenced the Court’s decision 
to revisit and recharacterize the holding of Roe v. Wade.194
Individual right theorists argue that the Second Amendment 
conferred an individual right to bear arms outside of the home.195
This theory is bolstered by historical sources, from Bill of Rights 
contemporaries to Post-Civil War commentators, all of whom agreed 
that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right.196
Furthermore, the historical sources support Individual Right 
theorists’ belief that the purpose of the Second Amendment was to 
provide Americans with a means of self-defense and protection from 
government tyranny.197 In Heller, the Court adopted the Individual 
Right theory in their holding, but acknowledged that the right was 
not unlimited and longstanding regulations of guns were 
permissible.198 Furthermore, in McDonald, the Court incorporated the 
right recognized in Heller and, thus, held that the Second 
USA TODAY (Oct. 12, 2015, 10:06 AM), http://college.usatoday.com/2015/10/12/ 
cocksnotglocks-protest-planned-by-university-of-texas-students/ [https://perma.cc/ 
YUL8-QK9Q].
189. See infra Section III.C.  
 190. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  
 191. See id. at 878-79. 
 192. See id. at 844. 
 193. See id.
 194. See infra Section III.C.
195. See supra Section I.A. 
196. See supra Section I.A. 
197. See supra Subsection I.A.2. 
198. See supra Subsection I.A.4.a.  
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Amendment applied to the states.199 As a result, two critical Second 
Amendment issues were decided in a span of two years, and a third 
issue, whether the right to bear arms extends outside of the home, 
has caused a split among the circuit courts.200 To solve the circuit 
split, the theories of Deliberative Democracy and Judicial 
Minimalism may be useful to the Supreme Court if it was to grant 
certiorari.201 Particularly, these theories may help the Court avoid the 
political and social backlash that may follow when the Court decides 
a contentious issue, such as Roe v. Wade.202
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The Ninth Circuit, in Peruta v. County of San Diego, recently 
addressed the Second Amendment and the question of one’s right to 
possess a gun outside of one’s home.203 The Ninth Circuit mimicked 
the analysis in Heller and examined historical sources to determine 
whether the right to keep and bear arms applied to individuals 
outside of their homes.204 The court concluded that the Second 
Amendment does not guarantee an individual the right to carry a 
concealed weapon outside of the home.205 Similarly, the Second, 
Third, and Fourth Circuits have held that similar regulations of the 
Second Amendment did not conflict with Heller.206 In Woollard v. 
Gallagher, the Fourth Circuit upheld a Maryland statute that required 
an applicant to demonstrate a good-and-substantial reason for 
carrying a gun.207 Similarly, in Drake v. Filko, the Third Circuit 
upheld a New Jersey statute that required individuals seeking a 
concealed weapons permit to demonstrate a justifiable need, beyond 
self-defense, to carry a gun.208 Last, in Kachalsky v. County of 
199. See supra Subsection I.A.4.b.  
200. See infra Part II. 
201. See supra Sections I.B-C.  
202. See supra Section I.D.  
 203. Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d 
en banc, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016) (“On October 23, 2009, after the County 
denied his application for a concealed-carry license, Peruta sued the county of San 
Diego . . . requesting injunctive and declaratory relief from the enforcement of the 
County policy’s interpretation of ‘good cause.’”).  
204. See Peruta, 824 F.3d at 929-39. 
205. See id. at 939. 
206. See Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 882 (4th Cir. 2013); Drake v. 
Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 440 (3d Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 
81, 86 (2d Cir. 2012).  
207. See Woollard, 712 F.3d at 882. 
208. See Drake, 724 F.3d at 429-30. 
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Westchester, the Second Circuit upheld New York’s proper cause 
requirement to carry a concealed weapon.209
Conversely, the Seventh Circuit invalidated an Illinois law that 
limited an individual’s right to carry a firearm to one’s home, 
property, or place of business.210 The Seventh Circuit recognized that 
the Illinois law amounted to an outright ban on carrying a gun and 
thus violated the Second Amendment as defined in Heller.211 Thus, 
the Seventh Circuit is the lone circuit that has recognized a right to 
bear arms outside of the home.212
A. The Seventh Circuit  
In 2012, the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of whether the 
right to bear arms extends outside of the home.213 Unlike its sister 
circuits, the Seventh Circuit held that the right to bear arms extends 
outside of the home.214 The Seventh Circuit struck down a far more 
intrusive regulation of the Second Amendment when it held that an 
outright ban on carrying weapons outside of the home was 
unconstitutional.215 As a result, only the Seventh Circuit has held that 
the right to bear arms in self-defense, as defined in Heller, extends 
outside of the home.216 In Moore v. Madigan,217 the Seventh Circuit 
struck down an Illinois statute that imposed an outright ban on 
carrying guns outside of the home.218 The Seventh Circuit struck 
down the law due to the government’s inability to justify an outright 
ban.219 The court recognized that some sort of regulation may be put 
in place, but the regulation may not destroy the Second Amendment 
right that Heller referred to as a right based on self-defense.220 One 
noticeable difference between the reasoning in Heller and the 
209. See Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 100. 
210. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012). 
211. See id. at 935. 
 212. See infra Section II.A.  
213. See infra Section II.A. 
214. See infra Section II.A. 
215. See Moore, 702 F.3d at 942. 
216. See infra Section II.A. 
 217. 702 F.3d 933. 
218. See id. at 934. 
219. See id. at 940 (“A blanket prohibition on carrying [a] gun in public 
prevents a person from defending himself anywhere except inside his home; and so 
substantial a curtailment of the right of armed self-defense requires a greater 
showing of justification than merely that the public might benefit on balance from 
such a curtailment, though there is no proof it would.”). 
220. See id.
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reasoning in Moore is that the Seventh Circuit in Moore considered 
the interests of the government and those supporting the outright ban 
through amici curiae.221
In Heller, the Court determined that the ban on handguns was 
per se invalid, and any consideration of the District of Columbia’s 
interest in the ban would be unnecessary because it destroyed the 
entire Second Amendment right.222 Therefore, in Heller, the ban 
could not stand regardless of how strong of an interest the District 
had in the ban.223 Here, Seventh Circuit precedent required that a 
panel reviewing a gun regulation imposed for the purpose of public 
safety must hold the government to a higher standard than rational 
basis.224 However, the actual standard was left ambiguous by the 
court.225 Regardless of whether the government had to satisfy rational 
basis scrutiny or the stronger burdens of intermediate or strict 
scrutiny, the important point is that the Seventh Circuit addressed the 
merits of the plaintiff’s self-defense argument and the government’s 
public safety argument, and decided that the government’s argument 
failed.226 Despite the Seventh Circuit’s consideration of the 
government’s interest in public safety, the court concluded, under 
Heller, that an outright ban on handguns could not comport with the 
Second Amendment and must be struck down.227
221. See id. at 935, 942 (“The theoretical and empirical evidence (which 
overall is inconclusive) is consistent with concluding that a right to carry firearms in 
public may promote self-defense. Illinois had to provide us with more than merely a 
rational basis for believing that its uniquely sweeping ban is justified by an increase 
in public safety. It has failed to meet this burden.”).  
222. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628-29 (2008) 
(“Under any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated 
constitutional rights, banning from the home ‘the most preferred firearm in the 
nation to “keep” and use for protection of one’s home and family,’ would fail 
constitutional muster.” (quoting Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 400 
(D.C. Cir. 2007))).  
223. See id. at 629. 
224. See Moore, 702 F.3d at 940 (“In Skoien we said that the government 
had to make a ‘strong showing’ that a gun ban was vital to public safety—it was not 
enough that the ban was ‘rational.’” (quoting United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 
641 (7th Cir. 2010))).  
225. See id. 
226. See id. at 939 (“In sum, the empirical literature on the effects of 
allowing the carriage of guns in public fails to establish a pragmatic defense of the 
Illinois law.”).  
227. See id. at 942 (“The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Second 
Amendment therefore compels us to reverse the decisions in the two cases before us 
and remand them to their respective district courts for the entry of declarations of 
unconstitutionality and permanent injunctions.”).  
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B. The Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits 
On the other side of the circuit split, the Second, Third, Fourth, 
and Ninth Circuits applied different standards to determine whether 
gun regulations outside of the home passed constitutional muster.228
The Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits assumed that the right to bear 
arms extended outside of the home, but did not affirmatively 
recognize that the right definitely extended outside of the home.229
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit did not use any formal doctrinal scrutiny, 
but held that the right to bear arms did not extend outside of the 
home after conducting a historical analysis.230 Thus, this side of the 
circuit split decided that very similar regulations that were 
unconstitutional in the Seventh Circuit, were constitutional in their 
circuits.231 The split is a result of clear analytical (and arguably 
political) differences in which the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits 
did not undertake a historical analysis, but did analyze, at the very 
least, the need for government to regulate guns for public safety.232
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit did undertake a historical 
analysis and came to a similar conclusion as the Second, Third, and 
Fourth Circuits.233 The most recent decision on this side of the circuit 
split was handed down by the Fourth Circuit in Woollard v. 
Gallagher.234
1. Woollard v. Gallagher
In Woollard v. Gallagher, the state of Maryland denied the 
plaintiff’s request for a renewal of his weapon permit after Maryland 
state officials determined that the plaintiff did not satisfy the good 
and substantial reason requirement under Maryland law.235 The 
plaintiff’s request for a permit renewal was denied due to his lack of 
documented threats on his application, despite a home invasion 
seven years earlier in which the plaintiff held his son-in-law (the 
home invader) at gun point after the two wrestled over a shotgun.236
228. See infra Subsections II.B.1-3.  
229. See infra Subsections II.B.1-3.
 230. See infra Subsection II.B.4. 
231. See infra Subsections II.B.1-3. 
232. See infra Subsections II.B.1-3.
 233. See infra Subsection II.B.4.  
234. See infra Subsection II.B.1. 
235. See Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 871 (4th Cir. 2013).  
236. See id.
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In order to obtain a concealed weapon permit in Maryland, an 
applicant must demonstrate that he or she has a good and substantial 
reason to wear or carry a firearm.237 However, if an applicant falls 
within the category of merely seeking a permit for personal 
protection, the applicant must demonstrate that there is an 
“apprehended danger” to their person, but a “general fear of ‘liv[ing] 
in a dangerous society’” will not suffice to receive a permit.238
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny and 
held that Maryland’s good and substantial reason requirement for 
concealed weapons permits was reasonably adapted to a substantial 
governmental interest of protecting public safety and preventing 
crime.239 Like the Ninth Circuit in Peruta, but unlike the Seventh 
Circuit in Moore, the court failed to consider the losing party’s 
interest and the reasons why the parties may support or oppose the 
Second Amendment right leaving the home, as required by 
Deliberative Democracy.240 The result is a Second Amendment 
holding that assumes that the right to self-defense in Heller extends 
outside of the home, but limits the right by upholding Maryland’s 
good-and-substantial-reason requirement.241
2. Drake v. Filko
Similar to Maryland in Woollard, New Jersey law requires that 
individuals demonstrate a “justifiable need” for a concealed weapons 
237. See id. at 869.  
238. See id. at 870 (quoting Scherr v. Handgun Permit Review Bd., 880 A.2d 
1137, 1148 (2005)). 
239. See id. at 876 (“As explained herein, the State has satisfied the 
intermediate scrutiny standard, in that it has demonstrated that the good-and-
substantial-reason requirement for obtaining a Maryland handgun permit . . . ‘is 
reasonably adapted to a substantial governmental interest.’”); id. at 877 (“In these 
circumstances, we can easily appreciate Maryland’s impetus to enact measures 
aimed at protecting public safety and preventing crime, and we readily conclude that 
such objectives are substantial governmental interests.”).  
240. See id. at 876-81 (discussing at length the state’s interest in preventing 
crime and protecting the public, while reducing the plaintiff’s argument for allowing 
self-defense outside of the home to a plead for the court to apply strict scrutiny); id.
at 878 (“The Appellees would have us place the right to arm oneself in public on 
equal footing with the right to arm oneself at home, necessitating that we apply strict 
scrutiny in our review of the good-and-substantial-reason requirement.”).  
241. See id. at 882 (“In summary, although we assume that Appellee 
Woollard’s Second Amendment right is burdened by the good-and-substantial-
reason requirement, we further conclude that such burden is constitutionally 
permissible.”).  
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permit.242 In Drake v. Filko, the plaintiffs were denied permits 
because the state determined that they failed to satisfy the justifiable 
need requirement to receive a permit.243 On appeal, the Third Circuit 
made two conclusions concerning the plaintiff’s challenge to the 
justifiable need requirement: (1) that the regulation was a 
presumptively lawful, longstanding regulation that did not burden the 
Second Amendment; and (2) that even if the justifiable need 
requirement did burden the Second Amendment, it withstood 
intermediate scrutiny as a constitutionally permissible burden.244
Like the Seventh Circuit in Woollard, the Third Circuit 
assumed that the Second Amendment right defined in Heller may be 
applicable outside of the home, but declined to affirmatively 
recognize that the right definitely extended outside of the home.245 In 
sum, the Third Circuit concluded that the New Jersey legislature had 
a significant interest in public safety and that requiring citizens to 
demonstrate a justifiable need for a permit was reasonable in 
response to the threat to public safety posed by guns.246 Notably 
absent from the Third Circuit’s opinion was any discussion of the 
plaintiff’s interests in obtaining a gun for the purpose of self-
defense.247
3. Kachalsky v. County of Westchester
The plaintiffs in Kachalsky v. County of Westchester were 
denied concealed weapons permits for their failure to demonstrate a 
242. See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 428 (3d Cir. 2013).  
243. See id. at 429. 
244. See id. at 429-30. 
245. See id. at 431 (“For these reasons, we decline to definitively declare that 
the individual right to bear arms for the purpose of self-defense extends beyond the 
home, the ‘core’ of the right as identified by Heller. We do, however, recognize that 
the Second Amendment’s individual right to bear arms may have some application 
beyond the home.”).  
246. See id. at 438. The Third Circuit gave the New Jersey legislature great 
deference in their decision to enact the justifiable need requirement, despite New 
Jersey’s inability to point to a single study or set of crime statistics showing an 
increase in gun violence warranting the new legislation. Id. at 437-38. However, 
despite any proof or showing of an increase in gun violence, the court determined 
that New Jersey supported their claim that the justifiable need requirement was 
reasonable. Id.
247. See generally Drake, 724 F.3d 426 (focusing solely on the 
government’s interest in public safety and preventing crime, but ignoring the 
specific situations or viewpoints of various plaintiffs challenging the law).  
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specific need for self-defense.248 Unlike the Ninth, Fourth and Third 
circuits, the Second Circuit did address and counter the plaintiffs’ 
arguments about the historical purpose of the Second Amendment, 
the plaintiffs’ possible needs for self-defense, and the statistical 
proof (or lack thereof) that an increase in guns in society may lead to 
increased crime.249 The court recognized that both sides submitted 
statistical studies contesting whether guns lead to increased gun 
violence in society.250 In the court’s view, the plaintiffs overestimated 
the scope of the Second Amendment by assuming that all regulations 
hindering their right to self-defense were per se invalid.251 While the 
court recognized that the plaintiffs’ needs for self-defense may arise 
without warning, New York’s interest in general public safety 
“outweighs the need to have a handgun for an unexpected 
confrontation.”252 Therefore, unlike the Third Circuit in Filko, the 
Fourth Circuit in Woollard, and the Ninth Circuit in Peruta, the 
Second Circuit considered the plaintiffs’ arguments and explicitly 
addressed why the court believed their arguments were not correct.253
The Seventh and Second Circuits, while they decided their Second 
Amendment issues differently, addressed the various interests of 
each party and made it clear why the losing party should lose their 
case.254
4. Peruta v. County of San Diego
In Peruta v. County of San Diego,255 the San Diego County 
Sheriff’s Department interpreted § 26150’s “good cause” 
requirement to receive a concealed weapons permit to be “a set of 
circumstances that distinguish the applicant from the mainstream and 
248. See Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 83-84 (2d Cir. 
2012).
249. See id. at 99-101. 
250. See id. at 99 (“To be sure, we recognize the existence of studies and 
data challenging the relationship between handgun ownership by lawful citizens and 
violent crime. We also recognize that many violent crimes occur without any 
warning to the victims. But New York also submitted studies and data 
demonstrating that widespread access to handguns in public increases the likelihood 
that felonies will result in death and fundamentally alters the safety and character of 
public spaces.”).  
251. See id. at 99-100. 
252. See id. at 100. 
253. See id. at 99-101. 
254. See id.; Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935, 942 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 255. 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016).  
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causes him or her to be placed in harm’s way.”256 The plaintiff 
challenged the county’s interpretation that the applicant’s individual 
safety alone, without a documented threat, was not considered “good 
cause” under § 26150.257 The plaintiff argued that by defining “good 
cause” to exclude those who wish to carry a gun for self-defense, the 
County had infringed his Second Amendment right to bear arms.258
The Ninth Circuit in Peruta mimicked the Supreme Court’s 
analyses in Heller and McDonald, both of which used historical 
analysis to answer the questions of whether the right to bear arms 
was an individual right and a fundamental right.259 Furthermore, the 
court in Peruta understood two issues to be settled law after Heller
and McDonald: (1) that keeping and bearing arms within the home 
has always been an individual right for the purpose of self-defense 
and (2) that the right is “among those fundamental rights necessary 
to our system of ordered liberty.”260 The court concluded, after an 
analysis of nineteenth century Second Amendment decisions, that the 
majority of nineteenth century courts agreed that the Second 
Amendment did not guarantee the right to carry a weapon outside of 
the home.261 The Ninth Circuit held that “the Second Amendment 
right to keep and bear arms does not include, in any degree, the right 
of a member of the general public to carry concealed firearms in 
public.”262 The Peruta court determined that because the right to bear 
256. Id. at 926. 
257. Id. at 927. 
258. See id. (“First, they contend that the Second Amendment guarantees at 
least some ability of a member of the general public to carry firearms in public. 
Second, they contend that California’s restrictions on concealed and open carry of 
firearms, taken together, violate the [Second] Amendment. Third, they contend that 
there would be sufficient opportunity for public carry of firearms to satisfy the 
Amendment if the good cause requirement for concealed carry, as interpreted by the 
sheriffs of San Diego and Yolo Counties, were eliminated.”). 
259. See id. at 927-29. “Finally, both Heller and McDonald identify the ‘core 
component’ of the right as self-defense, which necessarily ‘take[s] place wherever 
[a] person happens to be,’ whether in a back alley or on the back deck.” Peruta v. 
Cty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1153 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 824 F.3d 
919, 928-29 (9th Cir. 2016). 
260. Peruta, 824 F.3d at 928-29.  
261. Id. at 939 (“We therefore conclude that the Second Amendment right to 
keep and bear arms does not include, in any degree, the right of a member of the 
general public to carry concealed firearms in public.”). 
262. Id.
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arms does not extend outside of the home, the state may choose to 
impose any restriction on concealed carry that it deems necessary.263
As a result, these circuits have split on two different issues: 
(1) the correct scrutiny to apply to Second Amendment cases and 
(2) whether the right to bear arms in self-defense extends outside of 
the home.264 The Seventh Circuit held that the right to bear arms in 
self-defense does extend outside of the home, but refused to apply 
any kind of formal scrutiny in its case.265 Contrary to the holdings of 
the Seventh Circuit, the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits held that 
the right to bear arms may extend outside of the home.266 However, 
according to those circuits, denying concealed weapons permits on 
the basis of a need for general self-defense was a valid regulation 
under the Second Amendment since the regulations passed 
intermediate scrutiny.267 The Ninth Circuit, in a broad decision, held 
that the right to bear arms outside of the home does not exist and has 
never been guaranteed by the Second Amendment.268 However, the 
Ninth Circuit agreed with the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits 
when it held that the state may impose a “good cause” requirement 
as a prerequisite to carrying a gun.269
III. HOW THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD RESOLVE THE CIRCUIT
SPLIT: DEMOCRACY, JUDICIAL MINIMALISM, AND AVOIDING “ROE
RAGE”
If the Court is to resolve the circuit split, it should utilize the 
theories of Deliberative Democracy and Judicial Minimalism to craft 
its opinion. By doing so, the Supreme Court would be able to ensure 
that the democratic will of the people is not usurped from their 
elected representatives.270 A contentious and divisive issue, such as 
the ownership of guns in America, can further entrench the public in 
their views if the decision is decided by the Supreme Court in a way 
263. Id. (“Because the Second Amendment does not protect in any degree 
the right to carry concealed firearms in public, any prohibition or restriction a state 
may choose to impose on concealed carry—including a requirement of ‘good cause,’ 
however defined—is necessarily allowed by the Amendment.”).  
264. See supra Sections II.A-B.  
265. See supra Section II.A. 
266. See supra Subsections II.B.1-3. 
267. See id.
 268. See supra Subsection II.B.4. 
 269. See id.
270. See supra Sections III.A-B. 
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that permanently ends the debate on guns.271 An ideal Supreme Court 
decision resolves the issues (and only the issues) before the Court, 
defers to the elected branches of government when necessary, 
considers all interests at stake, and avoids alienating those that will 
likely disagree with the Court’s decision.272 These virtues are derived 
from the theories of Judicial Minimalism and Deliberative 
Democracy.273 These theories are a guide to ensuring that the most 
contentious issues in American society are resolved in a respectful, 
dignified and democratic manner, with the Court merely guiding the 
discussion. The ideals of Deliberative Democracy require that the 
Court consider the interests of both parties while settling on an 
outcome that is acceptable to most, if not all, parties involved. 
Similarly, the ideals of Judicial Minimalism would require that the 
Court decide a narrow issue, especially when the issue is a 
contentious one, in order to avoid unanticipated externalities of an 
overly broad decision. By employing both of these theories, the 
Court would ensure that the political and social backlash that 
plagued the broad Roe v. Wade decision does not reoccur. 
A. A Democratic Decision 
In order to reinforce the ideals of Deliberative Democracy in 
our society, the Court should make a prudent judgment concerning 
the divisive issue of whether individuals have a right to carry 
concealed weapons outside of the home. A prudent judgment on the 
issue of whether the Second Amendment extends outside of the 
home would take into account the complexity of the issue, such as a 
plaintiff’s need for a gun for self-defense and the government’s need 
to ensure public safety.274 In doing so, the Court will take into 
account the “practical realities” of the Second Amendment in 
modern America.275 Furthermore, when the Supreme Court holds that 
a statute is unconstitutional, occasionally the Court has usurped the 
271. See supra Section III.C. 
272. See generally Sunstein, supra note 86; Eskridge, supra note 147.  
273. See generally Sunstein, supra note 86; Eskridge, supra note 147. 
274. See Kronman, supra note 150, at 1569 (“A prudent judgment or 
political program is, above all, one that takes into account the complexity of its 
human and institutional setting, . . . but is nevertheless able to devise successful 
strategies for the advancement (however gradual or slow) of . . . favored principles 
and ideals.”).  
275. Id. at 1570. 
1394 Michigan State Law Review  2016 
power of the people to self-govern.276 When the Supreme Court 
strikes down a law as unconstitutional, “a present minority (and a 
very small one at that)” has effectively vetoed “a present 
majority.”277 When dealing with a contentious issue over which 
reasonable minds may differ, the Supreme Court should strive to 
defer to the elected representatives of the people and merely serve as 
a guide to the country’s values.278
American democracy is not dependent on the decisions of the 
Supreme Court to operate day-to-day, but democracy is dependent 
on the Court to be the arbiter of the most contentious constitutional 
issues that cannot be efficiently resolved by the political branches of 
government.279 When the Court does resolve contentious issues, it 
must ensure that the decision reflects upon all of the views of the 
various groups with interests in the outcome of the decision, or it 
may risk alienating various groups from the political process.280
Furthermore, a functional democratic system is simultaneously 
dependent on new groups entering the political discussion and 
retaining established groups.281 However, when new emerging groups 
are not granted access to political discourse, or when established 
groups feel that they have been shut out of a political discourse that 
they once dominated, the deliberation is at risk of collapsing.282 The 
Court can counter the possibility of collapse by ensuring that their 
decision is democratic and lowers the stakes of the political issues at 
hand.283
276. See id. at 1574 (“[W]hen the Supreme Court holds an executive or 
legislative act unconstitutional, ‘it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual 
people of the here and now’ and ‘exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing 
majority, but against it.’” (quoting BICKEL, supra note 150, at 17)).
277. See id. 
278. See id. at 1575 (“According to Bickel, it is the special responsibility of 
the Supreme Court (and, to a lesser degree, of inferior courts) to act as ‘the 
pronouncer and guardian’ of our society’s ‘enduring values.’”).  
279. See id. at 1581 (discussing the Court’s role as the “educator whose 
mission is to instruct and elevate, to bring out the best in us and show us where our 
own convictions lead”).  
280. See id. at 1592 (“This means that the institutions must not merely 
represent a numerical majority, which is a shifting and uncertain quantity anyway, 
but must reflect the people in all their diversity, so that all the people may feel that 
their particular interests and even prejudices, that all their diverse characteristics, 
were brought to bear on the decision-making process.” (quoting ALEXANDER 
BICKEL, POLITICS AND THE WARREN COURT 184 (1965))).
281. See Eskridge, supra note 147, at 1294. 
282. See id.
283. See id.
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If the Supreme Court were to decide this circuit split, it must 
ensure that its decision embraces the ideas of Deliberative 
Democracy in order to ensure that its decision does not unnecessarily 
vacate the decisions of elected officials.284 By giving deference to 
gun regulations, passed by state legislatures and within the 
constitutional limitations of government, the Court would be 
exercising the first principle of Deliberative Democratic theory: that 
the public must have a say in the decision-making process.285
However, the elected officials representing the public may not flout 
the Second Amendment protections enumerated by the Supreme 
Court in both Heller and McDonald.286 The virtue of ensuring that the 
people have a say in the way they are governed is evidenced by the 
Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits’ deference to legislatures that 
chose to enact “good cause” or “justifiable need” requirements to 
receive a concealed weapons permit.287 However, full deference to 
the will of the people is not required when it clearly conflicts with 
the Constitution since Deliberative Democracy only requires that the 
Court respect and consider, but not necessarily adopt, the viewpoints 
of the majority of people.288
In this particular circuit split, there are three types of 
government actors, on both the state and federal level, making 
decisions either burdening or broadening the Second Amendment.289
This continuum of government actors consists of county officials, 
state legislators, and the federal circuit courts, all of which have 
284. See Sen, supra note 145, at 305 (“At the heart of deliberative democracy 
is the idea that when free and equal people come together and discuss important 
decisions jointly—justifying their reasons publicly on the basis of generally 
understood principles—then the resulting policy will be both better for society and 
better for the participants themselves.”).  
285. See id. at 306 (“The first attribute of a deliberative democracy is the 
importance of public incorporation into the decision-making process.”).  
286. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008); 
McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010). 
287. See Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 881-82 (4th Cir. 2013); Drake 
v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 438 (3d Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 
F.3d 81, 98 (2d Cir. 2012). 
288. See Sen, supra note 145, at 306 (“For courts to fully embrace 
deliberative democracy (as many theorists believe they do), then actions and 
decisions must demonstrate respect for members of the public, and their opinions 
must be justified to all.”).  
289. See generally Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 
2014), rev’d en banc, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016); Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 
933 (7th Cir. 2012); Kachalsky, 701 F.3d 81; Drake, 724 F.3d 426; Woollard, 712 
F.3d 865. 
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taken some action concerning the Second Amendment.290 However, 
there is also a fourth government dynamic—the Constitution as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court.291 While there is some leeway for 
legislation and interpretation among the other three actors in the 
continuum, none of the actions taken by those three actors, even if 
perfectly legitimate under Deliberative Democratic theory, can trump 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Second Amendment.292
In Peruta, the controversy arose at the county level when the 
San Diego County Sherriff’s Department interpreted a state statute to 
preclude anyone citing a general need for self-defense from receiving 
a concealed weapons permit.293 The county’s interpretation was an 
undemocratic action because the county altered the meaning of the 
statute to impose a new requirement that was not authored by the 
California legislature.294 By changing the implications of the statute 
to fit its interpretation, the county impermissibly hindered the 
Second Amendment rights of its citizens by adopting an 
unreasonable interpretation in light of the holdings in Heller and 
McDonald.295 The unreasonable interpretation of the “good cause” 
statute adopted by the county sheriff’s department is the least 
democratic of all of the government actions challenged in this circuit 
split.296 When the legislation of a state legislature is impermissibly 
altered by a single county entity, then the will of the people has 
290. See generally Peruta, 742 F.3d 1144; Moore, 702 F.3d 933; Kachalsky,
701 F.3d 81; Drake, 724 F.3d 426; Woollard, 712 F.3d 865. 
 291. Specifically, the interpretation of the Second Amendment in Heller and 
McDonald trump the actions of the other government actors in this circuit split. 
292. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the 
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in 
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).  
293. See Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1148. 
294. See id. at 1169 (explaining that the county’s interpretation of the statute 
hinders a citizen’s right to bears arms in self-defense and that the interpretation 
made it impossible for citizens to distinguish themselves as needing protection); see 
also Sen, supra note 145, at 306 (explaining that the first attribute of Deliberative 
Democracy is ensuring that those that are governed have a say in how they are 
governed).
295. See Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1153 (noting that both Heller and McDonald
recognized a fundamental right to self-defense wherever a person is).  
296. See Sen, supra note 145, at 306 (noting that Deliberative Democracy is 
dependent on the governed having a say in the decisions of elected officials). While 
the County Sherriff is elected on a local level, he is but one actor having a profound 
effect on the legislation passed by a majority of the California Legislature. 
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arguably been usurped at the local level.297 The usurpation of power, 
in this case, is by a local county entity misinterpreting the clear 
language of the elected state legislature.298
Unlike in Peruta, the controversies from Moore, Filko,
Woollard, and Kachalsky were direct challenges to the statutes 
passed by state legislatures.299 Assuming there was spirited 
deliberation in the state legislatures, then the various interests of the 
people the legislatures represent were heard and vetted by both sides, 
thus satisfying the principle of reciprocity.300 In Deliberative 
Democracy, the principle of reciprocity requires that deliberation be 
done in public and that each competing side’s reasons be accessible 
to the other side.301 For example, the principle of reciprocity would 
not be satisfied if, during deliberation, Republicans cited a religious 
text as a justification for the Second Amendment extending outside 
of the home.302 Likewise, the principle of reciprocity would not be 
satisfied if, during deliberation, Democrats argued that only the 
government could be trusted with guns in public and the Second 
Amendment could not possibly extend outside of the home.303
However, the ideals of Deliberative Democracy were most likely 
satisfied by the legislatures in Moore, Filko, Woollard, and 
Kachalsky in enacting the various statutes precluding citizens from 
offering self-defense as a reason for obtaining a concealed weapons 
 297. Of course, if the county Sherriff conducted a town-hall meeting where 
county residents could deliberate and convince each other of the correct course of 
action, then the ideals of Deliberative Democracy would be satisfied and the 
outcome, whether for or against the interpretation of the statute, would have been 
democratically legitimate. See id. at 305 (“At the heart of deliberative democracy is 
the idea that when free and equal people come together and discuss important 
decisions jointly—justifying their reasons publicly on the basis of generally 
understood principles—then the resulting policy will be both better for society and 
better for the participants themselves.”).  
298. See Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1169; supra notes 296-97. 
299. See generally Peruta, 742 F.3d 1144; Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 
865 (4th Cir. 2013); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. Cty. 
of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012); Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th 
Cir. 2012). 
300. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 154, at 4. 
301. See id. (“First, the deliberation itself must take place in public, not 
merely in the privacy of one’s mind.”).  
302. See id. (noting that appeals to religion as a support for public policy are 
inaccessible to others that do not share that belief).  
303. See id. The principle of reciprocity would not be satisfied in this case 
because it negates the stated purpose of the Second Amendment, which is to limit 
the government in regulating guns and to ensure that the country remains free from 
tyranny. See U.S. CONST. amend. II.  
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permit.304 Also, Deliberative Democracy, while helpful and 
aspirational, cannot trump the Supreme Court precedent and analysis 
undertaken in Heller and McDonald.305
To comply with Deliberative Democracy, courts must ensure 
that they address both sides of the argument while rendering a 
decision that is a result of analysis that is accessible to both sides.306
Unfortunately, of the five decisions in this Second Amendment 
circuit split, only one decision made a thorough examination of both 
arguments and justified its decision in terms that both parties could 
likely accept.307 The Seventh Circuit in Moore addressed each 
empirical and constitutional argument that the state offered in 
support of the outright ban of carrying handguns in public in 
Illinois.308 For every well-researched study the state offered, the court 
pointed to other well-researched studies from the plaintiff’s brief to 
counter the state’s argument.309 When the state presented evidence 
that gun ownership leads to an increase in homicides, the petitioners 
rebutted with evidence that violent crime and gun ownership were 
falling simultaneously.310 The court treated these responsive 
arguments as offsetting and further noted that the study presented by 
the state dealt with ownership and not with concealed carry.311 As a 
result, the court considered both sides of the empirical evidence as 
offsetting and determined that the state failed to demonstrate that 
“the public might benefit . . . though there is no proof it would.”312
Thus, the Moore court addressed both sides of the empirical 
argument and determined that any results about concealed carry or 
304. See generally Woollard, 712 F.3d 865; Drake, 724 F.3d 426; 
Kachalsky, 701 F.3d 81; Moore, 702 F.3d 933. 
305. See Part I (discussing the Individual Right theory of the Second 
Amendment, the Court’s adoption of that theory in Heller, and the Heller right’s 
incorporation to the States through the Due Process Clause in McDonald).
306. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 154, at 4 (arguing that a 
democratic decision, which may be disagreeable to certain groups, is still accessible 
as long as the disagreeing side can understand the essential content of the decision).  
307. See Moore, 702 F.3d at 939 (arguing that while the empirical literature 
is telling about gun violence in Illinois, a wholesale ban on guns cannot comport 
with the Second Amendment).  
308. See id. at 937-41 (countering the various empirical studies on gun 
violence and ownership while providing alternatives to an outright ban that 
withstood scrutiny in other circuits).  
309. See id. at 937-39 (discussing the various empirical studies for and 
against a ban on carrying weapons in public).  
310. See id. at 938. 
311. See id.
312. See id. at 940. 
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gun ownership in general were inconclusive.313 Therefore, the state’s 
case for an outright ban relied solely on historical interpretations of 
the Second Amendment.314 However, precedent established by the 
Supreme Court in Heller and McDonald rejected the notion that the 
Second Amendment was understood by its contemporaries to convey 
a right to the states.315 In Moore, there was deliberation at every stage 
of decision making, from the legislature to the Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals, satisfying Deliberative Democratic theory.316
Furthermore, the outcome in Moore was accessible to both sides of 
the argument because the empirical data depicted a stalemate and 
stare decisis mandated that the holdings of Heller and McDonald
govern.
However, the circuit courts in Peruta, Filko, Woollard, and 
Kachalsky did not demonstrate any adherence to Deliberative 
Democratic theory and, specifically, the principle of reciprocity.317
Not only did the Ninth Circuit incorrectly decide the issue of good 
cause requirements in light of the Supreme Court’s adherence to the 
Individual Right theory, but it also failed to address any of the 
interests that the appellants had in carrying a concealed weapon for 
the purpose of self-defense.318 In Peruta, the court determined that 
the Second Amendment does not and never has guaranteed an 
individual the right to carry a concealed weapon in public.319 As a 
result, the court determined that the County’s interpretation was 
313. See id. at 939.  
314. See id. at 935 (explaining that the Supreme Court rejected notion that 
the Second Amendment conferred a right to the states in Heller and McDonald).  
315. See id. 935-36 (“Both Heller and McDonald do say that ‘the need for 
defense of self, family, and property, is most acute’ in the home, but that doesn’t 
mean it is not acute outside the home. Heller repeatedly invokes a broader Second 
Amendment right than the right to have a gun in one’s home, as when it says that the 
amendment ‘guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case 
of confrontation.’ Confrontations are not limited to the home.”).  
316. See id. at 937-41. The Seventh Circuit considered both sides of the 
argument and, I assume, that the legislature considered both sides during debate on 
the outright ban in Illinois. 
317. See generally Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016); 
Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 
(3d Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012). 
318. See generally Peruta, 824 F.3d 919 (lacking any meaningful discussion 
of the possible arguments for the appellants’ interest in carrying a concealed weapon 
for the purpose of self-defense).  
319. See id. at 929-39 (looking to historical interpretations of the Second 
Amendment and concluding that the Amendment does not and has never conferred 
an individual right to carry a concealed weapon).  
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perfectly valid and did not need to address the appellant’s argument 
in support of concealed carry.320
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit discussed the state’s arguments in 
support of the good and substantial reason requirement at length, but 
characterized the plaintiff’s argument in support of the right to carry 
a concealed weapon as a plea for the court to apply strict scrutiny.321
The court mischaracterized the petitioner’s argument as a plea for the 
court to abandon Fourth Circuit precedent by applying strict scrutiny 
to Second Amendment issues, when the petitioner’s argument was 
actually a plea for the court to adhere to the teachings of Heller and 
McDonald that the right to bear arms in self-defense is a fundamental 
liberty.322 In Filko, the Third Circuit correctly assumed that the 
Second Amendment right was applicable outside of the home, but 
upheld New Jersey’s justifiable need requirement without any 
empirical support for the legislation.323 As a result, residents of New 
Jersey had to provide a justifiable need to carry a gun in public, but 
New Jersey did not have to provide the court with a justifiable need 
of their own to hinder the Second Amendment.324 Furthermore, the 
court failed to address any of the possible interests that the petitioner 
had in obtaining a concealed weapons permit for the purpose of self-
320. See id. at 939 (“Our holding that the Second Amendment does not 
protect the right of a member of the general public to carry concealed firearms in 
public fully answers the question before us. Because the Second Amendment does 
not protect in any degree the right to carry concealed firearms in public, any 
prohibition or restriction a state may choose to impose on concealed carry—
including a requirement of ‘good cause,’ however defined—is necessarily allowed 
by the Amendment.”).  
321. See Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876-81 (discussing at-length the state’s 
interest in preventing crime and protecting the public, while reducing the plaintiff’s 
argument for allowing self-defense outside of the home to a plead for the court to 
apply strict scrutiny).  
322. See id. at 878 (“The Appellees would have us place the right to arm 
oneself in public on equal footing with the right to arm oneself at home, 
necessitating that we apply strict scrutiny in our review of the good-and-substantial-
reason requirement.”).  
323. See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 437-38 (3d Cir. 2013) (illustrating 
that the court gave the New Jersey legislature great deference in their decision to 
enact the justifiable need requirement, despite New Jersey’s inability to point to a 
single study or set of crime statistics showing an increase in gun violence warranting 
the new legislation).  
324. See id. at 438. The Third Circuit determined that New Jersey supported 
its claim that the justifiable need requirement was reasonable without providing any 
evidence of an increase in gun violence. Id.
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defense.325 Thus, if the Supreme Court were to resolve this circuit 
split, it should consider the various shortcomings of the circuit court 
decisions, due to their lack of adherence to the ideals of Deliberative 
Democracy, when writing its opinion.326
B. A Minimalist Decision 
The Supreme Court’s ability to remove a particular issue from 
public discourse can be near absolute.327 By removing an issue from 
the public discourse, the Court’s holding on a particular issue, 
though in agreement with the popular politics of the time, may be 
counterproductive overall.328 For example, the issue of abortion was 
permanently removed from the public discourse when the Court 
decided the fundamental abortion issue within one case.329 While the 
Court’s decision on this issue would not be nearly as abrupt as its 
decision in Roe v. Wade, the Court would still be removing a divisive 
issue from the public discourse.330 Roe v. Wade is a maximalist 
decision, as opposed to a minimalist decision, because the Court 
made broad pronouncements about abortion and the Fourteenth 
Amendment that were not necessary to resolving the case at hand.331
As a result, opposition to abortion may have been galvanized as a 
result of the Court’s removal of the issue from public discourse.332
Heller is one example of a maximalist decision in the context 
of the Second Amendment.333 In Heller, the Court concluded that the 
Second Amendment conferred an individual right despite the 
arguably controversial language in the prefatory clause of the 
325. See generally id. at 426 (focusing solely on the government’s interest in 
public safety and preventing crime, but ignoring the specific situations or viewpoints 
of various plaintiffs who challenged the law).  
326. See supra Section III.A (analyzing the lack of Deliberative Democratic 
ideals utilized in the circuit court decisions of this circuit split).  
327. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (holding that an outright 
ban on abortion violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).  
328. See Sunstein, supra note 86, at 20 (“In sum, minimalism can promote 
democracy because it allows democratic processes room to maneuver. Judges should 
allow such room because their judgments might be wrong and, even if right, their 
judgments may be counterproductive.”).  
329. See id. (referring to the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade and 
the Court’s mistake of deciding “too many issues too quickly”).  
330. See id.
331. See id. at 20, 27. 
 332. See infra Section III.C. 
 333. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).  
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Amendment.334 A minimalist decision with the same facts as Heller
might have ruled in favor of the petitioner and held that the Second 
Amendment protects the right to keep weapons within the home.335
However, in order to narrow its maximalist decision, the Court might 
have upheld the District’s requirement that guns be locked at all 
times.336 The hypothetical minimalist Court could further parse the 
issue and allow that the gun may be kept loaded, to enable the owner 
to be prepared for confrontation, but still require the gun to be 
locked.337 This hypothetical minimalist Court would have considered 
the principles of the competing sides to the issue and crafted its 
decision to avoid galvanizing the opposition to gun rights.338 If the 
Court were to take up Peruta in the coming terms, the Court should 
craft a prudential decision that embraces the idea of “democracy-
forcing minimalism.”339
A decision promoting democracy-forcing minimalism would 
decide the issue narrowly and leave further questions open.340 By 
deciding the issue narrowly, the Court would be granting legislatures 
the ability to speak clearly in their statutes and better tailor their laws 
to comport with the Constitution.341 However, if the Court did not 
wish to foreclose debate on the issue of whether the Second 
Amendment applies outside of the home, the Court could decide a 
less substantive issue, such as the type of scrutiny to apply to Second 
Amendment cases. For example, in Peruta the Ninth Circuit did not 
apply any sort of formal scrutiny in deciding whether the Second 
Amendment protected concealed carry of firearms.342 Conversely, the 
other circuits in the circuit split analyzed similar statutes using 
334. See id. at 592. 
335. See Sunstein, supra note 86, at 21 (noting that when a contentious issue 
is before the Court, “the Justices can make progress by putting those disagreements 
to one side and converging on an outcome and a relatively modest rationale on its 
behalf”). For example, this hypothetical would require a majority of justices to agree 
that a person has a right to defend himself inside his home, but the hypothetical 
Court may compromise by recognizing the right, while allowing reasonable 
limitation of the right. Id.
336. See Heller, 554 U.S at 575. 
337. See id.
338. See Sunstein, supra note 86, at 97. 
339. See id. at 25. 
340. See id.
341. See id.
342. See Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 925-42 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(refusing to apply formal scrutiny on the Second Amendment issue and, instead, 
conducting a historical analysis to determine the scope of the right).  
 Passive Virtues and the Second Amendment 1403 
intermediate scrutiny.343 Therefore, if the Supreme Court felt that 
holding that the Second Amendment extends outside of the home 
would invite overwhelming political backlash, the Court may choose 
to simply define the type of scrutiny that must be applied to cases in 
which the Second Amendment has been burdened.344 Thus, if the 
Supreme Court simply defined the type of scrutiny that the circuit 
courts should apply, the Court would have clarified the type of 
analysis that circuit courts should perform, while leaving the 
substantive constitutional issue open for debate.345
Thus, the Supreme Court should be cognizant of the effect that 
its holding may have on the political climate.346 While it is the duty 
of the Supreme Court to decide issues that the circuit courts have 
disagreed on, it is by no means required to decide each and every 
issue that arises. With that in mind, the Court should ensure that a 
highly contentious issue, such as guns in society, remains a topic for 
debate among the political branches of state governments.347 In doing 
so, the Court would be using Judicial Minimalism in a way that 
reinforces Democracy, rather than undercutting it.348 To reinforce 
Democracy, the Court can grant certiorari in order to clarify an issue, 
such as the correct scrutiny to apply, rather than to permanently 
decide a substantive issue, such as whether the Second Amendment 
extends outside of the home.349 In doing so, the Court will ensure that 
the political backlash of Roe v. Wade is not relived through a 
different constitutional issue. 
C. Avoiding Second Amendment “Roe Rage” 
In 2015, there were 372 instances in which four or more people 
were killed by someone wielding a gun.350 Shootings, such as the 
Newtown Elementary School shooting and the Aurora Colorado 
343. See Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013); Drake v. 
Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 429-30 (3d Cir. 2013); Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 941 
(7th Cir. 2012). 
344. See supra Part II (describing the difference in constitutional scrutiny 
applied to Second Amendment cases among the different circuits). 
345. See supra Part II; supra Section III.A. 
346. See supra Section III.B. 
347. See id.
348. See id.
349. See id.
350. See Millie Dent, 21 Unbelievable Facts About Guns in America, FISCAL
TIMES (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2016/01/07/21-Unbelievable-
Facts-About-Guns-America [https://perma.cc/TMX6-2D8G].  
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movie theater shooting, have galvanized left-leaning politicians and 
citizens to denounce guns and call for reform of how this country 
treats the Second Amendment.351 Similarly, right-leaning politicians 
and organizations, such as the NRA, are more determined than ever 
to ensure that the right to keep and bear arms remains protected.352
Furthermore, the diversion of politicians and the public to the far-
right and far-left on the issue of gun control could have a profound 
impact on the country.353 Thus, a broad ruling by the Supreme Court 
on a contentious issue could spark the same type of backlash that the 
Court sparked when it handed down Roe v. Wade.354
The Roe decision arguably led to the rise of the pro-life 
movement and the galvanization of the evangelical right in 
opposition to the liberal legislative agenda.355 Like Roe, a Supreme 
Court decision resolving the substantive issue of whether the Second 
Amendment leaves the home may have similar disastrous effects.356
If the Supreme Court were to decide the substantive issue present in 
the current Second Amendment circuit split by recognizing that the 
right to bear arms extends outside of the home and that this right is 
fundamental, the decision may galvanize the opposition to gun rights 
for years to come.357 However, unlike with Roe, a decision resolving 
this issue would result in the rise of the extreme left, rather than the 
extreme right.358
A maximalist decision declaring the right to bear arms outside 
of the home as fundamental would likely invite strong backlash from 
the political left and may result in the Court recharacterizing its 
351. See Fabian, supra note 188; see also Samuels, supra note 188. 
352. See Scott Wong & Cristina Marcos, GOP Scrambles for Response to 
Obama’s Gun Control Actions, HILL (Jan. 5, 2016, 3:13 PM), http://thehill.com/ 
homenews/house/264812-gop-scrambles-for-response-on-guns [https://perma.cc/P34H-
RE63]; Tim Devaney, Obama, NRA on Collision Course, HILL (Jan. 5, 2016, 6:00 
AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/264735-obama-nra-on-collision-
course [https://perma.cc/Q35H-6WMK].  
353. See Rebecca Leber, Gun Control Can Swing the 2016 Election, NEW 
REPUBLIC (Jan. 14, 2016), https://newrepublic.com/article/127473/gun-control-can-
swing-2016-election [https://perma.cc/5497-BNMP].  
354. See generally Post & Siegal, supra note 183; supra Section I.D.  
355. See Post & Siegal, supra note 183, at 407-08. 
356. See id. at 378 (noting that extreme views against abortion did not gain 
prominence until the years following the Roe decision). 
357. See id. at 380 (noting that “Americans have thus found it important that 
courts articulate a vision of the Constitution that reflects their own ideals”).  
358. See id. at 378.  
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holding in subsequent cases.359 Such was the case when the holding 
of Roe v. Wade was subsequently pealed back by the Court’s holding 
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.360 In 
Casey, the Court opened its opinion by stating that “liberty finds no 
refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”361 This opening line is 
undoubtedly a reference to the political backlash, the calls for Roe to 
be overturned, and the sentiment that Roe was constitutionally 
incorrect.362 Thus, Casey recharacterized the holding in Roe by 
scrapping the trimester framework of when an abortion could be 
performed, changing the analysis from strict scrutiny to undue 
burden, and allowing the state to pursue its interest in potential life.363
If the Court were to make a maximalist decision holding that the 
Second Amendment right extends outside of the home and that the 
right is fundamental, then the Court’s Second Amendment 
jurisprudence will be left exposed to a subsequent Court’s possible 
recharacterization of its holding.364
By employing the theories of Deliberative Democracy and 
Judicial Minimalism in crafting its decision, the Court would ensure 
that the disastrous effects of Majoritarian Democracy, evidenced by 
the backlash to Roe v. Wade, would not occur.365 The backlash that 
followed Roe v. Wade is illustrative of the reaction of political 
groups that feel a majority has imposed its will on a powerless 
minority.366 Following Roe v. Wade, the “political losers”367 of the 
decision—the evangelical right—became more polarized on the issue 
359. See Sunstein, supra note 86, at 26 (noting that “if subsequent courts 
have a great deal of discretion to recharacterize holdings, they can effectively turn 
any prior decision into a minimalist opinion”). 
 360. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
361. Id. at 844. 
362. See Post & Siegal, supra note 183, at 407-08. 
363. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878-79. 
364. See id. (peeling back the broad holding of Roe v. Wade as a response to 
the political backlash from the political right); Sunstein, supra note 86, at 26 (noting 
that a subsequent Court can undertake “creative reinterpretation” to recharacterize 
past holdings). 
365. See supra Section I.B (discussing the disastrous effects of Majoritarian 
Democracy); supra Section I.D (describing the political backlash that resulted from 
the broad decision of Roe v. Wade).
366. See supra Section I.D; Eskridge, supra note 147, at 1294 (describing the 
reaction of “political losers” as leaving the democratic process in protest of the lack 
of deliberation).  
 367. Eskridge, supra note 147, at 1294. 
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of abortion368 and resorted to enclave deliberation.369 It is likely that if 
the Court did not adhere to the principles of Deliberative Democracy 
and Judicial Minimalism, then special interest groups that are anti-
gun rights will react in a similar fashion as the evangelical right did 
to Roe v. Wade. Thus, Majoritarian Democracy, a theory critical of 
deliberation in general, would be a less than ideal theory to decide 
the issue of whether there is a right to bear arms outside of the home. 
If the Court were to decide this contentious issue, it should do 
so in a way that embraces the ideals of Deliberative Democratic 
theory and Judicial Minimalism in order to avoid the disastrous 
outcome of Roe v. Wade.370 By embracing Deliberative Democracy, 
the Court would have to address the interests of both sides and 
provide reasoning and an outcome that can be accepted by 
reasonable parties.371 In doing so, the Court would avoid the one-
sided reasoning and outcomes that many of the circuit courts 
applied.372 In addition to applying Deliberative Democracy in their 
reasoning, the Court should employ Judicial Minimalism to limit the 
breadth of their decision and any unanticipated externalities of the 
decision.373 By limiting its holding to a narrow issue, such as the 
correct type of scrutiny to apply to Second Amendment cases, the 
Court will avoid deciding a contentious and substantive 
constitutional issue that could result in social and political 
backlash.374 If the Court were to stray from these theories and 
unilaterally decide that the Second Amendment extends outside of 
the home, the Court would risk the social and political backlash of 
the political left overpowering its Second Amendment jurisprudence, 
thus, resulting in a weaker Second Amendment right. 
CONCLUSION
Following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Heller and 
McDonald, the Federal Circuit Courts were presented with the 
question of whether the right to bear arms extended outside of the 
home. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the Second Amendment 
368. See Post & Siegal, supra note 183, at 378 (discussing the polarization of 
the evangelical right on the abortion issues following the Roe decision).  
369. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 160, at 15. 
370. See supra Part III. 
371. See supra Section III.A. 
372. See supra Part II. 
373. See supra Section III.B. 
374. See supra Section III.B.
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extended outside of the home. The Second, Third, and Fourth 
Circuits concluded that the Second Amendment may extend outside 
of the home, but that a state’s denial of a concealed weapons permit 
for the purpose of general self-defense was a permissible burden on 
the right. The Ninth Circuit, in extreme fashion, declared that the 
Second Amendment does not and has never supported the right to 
carry a concealed weapon outside of the home. In order to resolve 
this split, the Court should utilize the theories of Deliberative 
Democracy and Judicial Minimalism in order to avoid the backlash 
that the Court has previously experienced when it has broadly 
decided a contentious issue. 
If the Court were to decide the issue of whether the Second 
Amendment right extends outside of the home, it should do so by 
utilizing Deliberative Democracy and Judicial Minimalism to ensure 
that its decision is not subsequently altered, thus, resulting in a 
weakened Second Amendment. The Court should employ 
Deliberative Democracy by addressing the arguments and 
counterarguments of both sides and settling upon a holding that can 
be reasonably accepted by both sides, rather than alienating one side. 
Furthermore, the Court should decide a narrow issue, such as the 
correct scrutiny lower courts should apply when analyzing the 
Second Amendment, to ensure that the substantive constitutional 
issue is not prematurely removed from political discourse. By using 
these theories, the Court will ensure that subsequent Courts do not 
recharacterize its Second Amendment jurisprudence in order to 
weaken Second Amendment rights.  
If the Court were to resolve this circuit split at a time when gun 
rights are the subject of vigorous debate, the public may feel that the 
Court has removed an important political issue from the political 
process. The removal of this issue from the political process may 
result in political and social backlash similar to the backlash that 
occurred following Roe v. Wade. This backlash would place 
tremendous pressure on the political branches of government and the 
Court to overturn its decision recognizing that the Second 
Amendment is applicable outside of the home. Thus, in order to 
protect the Second Amendment, the Court should employ the 
theories of Deliberative Democracy and Judicial Minimalism to 
ensure that the Second Amendment right is protected for generations 
to come.
